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INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of expression is a fundamental right in any well-established 
democracy.1 This right promotes the free flow of information, thoughts, 
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and ideas. Freedom of expression prohibits leaders from manipulating their 
power, stifling progress, and eliminating the voice of change. Inherent in the 
freedom of the right to express is the right to oppose.2 Expression that goes 
against the status quo “serves a vital social function in offsetting or 
ameliorating the normal process of bureaucratic decay.”3 It empowers the 
citizens of a democratic nation with the means to promote and maintain justice 
by challenging majority ideas about fairness, equality, and justice. Through 
this exercise,  
[a] nation's unity is created through blending individual differences 
rather than imposing homogeneity from above; that the ability to 
explore fullest range of ideas on a given issue was essential to any 
learning process and truth cannot be arrived upon unless all points of 
view are first considered; and that by considering free thought, 
censorship acts to the detriment of material progress.4 
This fundamental right to freedom of expression is threatened by the use 
of morals clauses in celebrity endorsement deals. Morals clauses are 
contractual provisions that provide corporations with an express, unfettered 
right to terminate an athlete or celebrity spokesperson’s endorsement 
contract when the endorser acts in a manner deemed socially reprehensible 
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 1. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
 2. RANDAL MARLIN, PROPAGANDA AND THE ETHICS OF PERSUASION 240–
41 (2002). 
 3. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 
72 YALE L.J. 877, 884 (1964). 
 4. See RHONA K. M. SMITH & CHRISTIEN VAN DEN ANKER, THE ESSENTIALS 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 127 (2005) (discussing one of the earliest defenses advanced 
by John Milton, English Poet and political writer, in favor of freedom of speech 
in his work, “Areopagitica”). 
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by corporate leadership.5 Such provisions typically are included in 
standard endorsement contracts and give the corporation wide latitude to 
cancel the agreement upon an act by the celebrity spokesperson perceived 
as detrimental to the corporation’s brand and image.6 
Providing corporations with such broad discretion impairs social 
progress because morals clauses can stifle thought-provoking and change-
oriented speech. The very essence of the First Amendment is subjugated to 
a meaningless idea of grandeur because modern-day corporations now have 
an unbridled right to temper speech in the private context through the use 
of broadly drafted morals clauses. This reality is inherently dangerous 
because a corporation has the right to regulate or restrict speech based 
upon its assessment of how society will view the endorser’s expression. 
This idea fundamentally is flawed for several reasons. First, given that 
corporations are driven primarily by profit maximization, it is unnatural to 
assign to them moral authority. Second, because white Americans—
specifically, white American males—occupy the overwhelming majority 
of corporate leadership, the initial determination about what conduct is 
morally reprehensible will be made by a homogenous group of people who 
often views the world from a uniform perspective. Third, if morality is 
determined by calculating what the majority of the spending population 
thinks,7 then such a determination will favor white Americans’ 
conceptions of morality because the majority of wealth in the United States 
                                                                                                             
 5. Fernando Pinguelo & Tim Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals? 
An Examination of Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What Talent Needs to 
Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS 348, 351 (2009). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See, e.g., Toni Lester, “Finding the ‘Public’ in ‘Public Disrepute” – 
Would the Cultural Defense Make a Difference in Celebrity and Sports 
Endorsement Contract Disputes? - The Case of Michael Vick and Adrian 
Peterson, 6 PACE INTELL. PROP. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 21 (2016) (explaining that 
conceptions of morality often are influenced by racial and cultural factors as 
evidenced by an ESPN poll that reflected that 57% of black Americans believed 
that the media is biased against black athletes while only seven percent of white 
Americans held the same belief. The poll further reflected that black people 
believe that “the media unfairly criticizes black athletes more than white athletes, 
while the white fans suggest there is no difference in the media's handling of 
various cases.”); see also Jennifer Agiesta, CNN poll: Americans split on anthem 
protests, CNN (Sept. 30, 2017, 2:29 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/29/politics 
/national-anthem-nfl-cnn-poll/index.html (highlighting a poll that found that 59% 
of whites said that kneeling during the National Anthem is wrong, whereas 82% of 
blacks said that it's the right thing to do) [https://perma.cc/9TQT-X65V].  
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is concentrated in the hands of white Americans.8 Fourth, due to an 
incomplete understanding of the truth and a natural desire for people to 
maintain the status quo—even when it is wrong or unjust—determining 
what is morally acceptable is often difficult and normally takes time. 
Finally, broadly drafted morals clauses present a Hobson’s choice9 for 
celebrity endorsers by placing the endorser in the unfair and unreasonable 
position of sacrificing their freedom of expression, particularly concerning 
social justice issues, for monetary gain. 
American history is riddled with athletes and entertainers who have 
expressed themselves in ways that were deemed morally wrong at the time 
of expression; after the passage of time and social enlightenment, 
however, the same expression was championed as morally acceptable. 
Based on the discretion that corporations have to evaluate morality, they 
can terminate endorsement contracts prematurely according to their own 
biased perceptions of morality before this enlightenment process occurs. 
Muhammed Ali exemplifies this truth. 
In 1966, legendary boxer Muhammed Ali10 famously remarked, “I 
ain’t got no quarrel with them Viet Cong. No Viet Cong ever called me 
nigger,” after he refused to serve in the army during the Vietnam War by 
claiming conscientious objector status.11 When the public pressed Ali 
further about his refusal to serve, he eloquently remarked, 
You want me to do what the white man says and go fight a war 
against some people I don’t know nothing about-get some freedom 
for some other people when my own people can’t get theirs? We’re 
over there so that the people of South Vietnam can be free. But I’m 
here in America and I’m being punished for upholding my beliefs.12 
                                                                                                             
 8. Matt Bruenig, The Top 10% of White Families Own Almost Everything, 
DEMOS (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.demos.org/blog/9/5/14/top-10-white-families 
-own-almost-everything [https://perma.cc/93HR-J8ZC]. 
 9. A Hobson’s choice literally means “take it or leave it.” See Caroline 
Epstein, Moral Clause: Past, Present & Future, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. 
L. 73, 98–99, for a discussion on the harsh results of broadly drafted moral clauses. 
 10. Biography of Muhammad Ali, BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com 
/people/muhammad-ali-9181165 (last visited Aug. 19, 2017) (explaining that 
Muhammad Ali, three-time World Heavyweight Champion and Olympic Gold 
Medalist, was a famous 20th century sports figure and activist and is considered 
the greatest athlete of the 20th century) [https://perma.cc/68EM-FJQM]. 
 11. Muhammad Ali - in his own words, BBC SPORT (June 4, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/sport/boxing/16146367 [https://perma.cc/H35F-M7W8]. 
 12. HOWARD L BINGHAM & MAX WALLACE, MUHAMMAD ALI’S GREATEST 
FIGHT: CASSIUS CLAY VS. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 149 (2012). 
2017] AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION 5 
 
 
 
In response to his refusal to serve and his open criticism of the war, 
Ali drew the ire of the American public who, at the time, found his actions 
cowardly, anti-American, and unpatriotic.13 As a result of his refusal to 
serve in the army, Ali was convicted and sentenced to five years in prison 
for draft evasion.14 Additionally, his boxing license was suspended, and he 
was stripped of his boxing title while his case was under appeal.15 Four 
years after he first was convicted, the United States Supreme Court, in a 
seven-to-two vote, overturned his conviction.16 When Ali expressed his 
political discontent about the Vietnam War, there was an overwhelming 
public backlash against his actions.17 In hindsight, however, Ali now is 
regarded as a hero for independent free thought and as a world champion 
of positive social activism.18 
Social activism also was on display during the 1968 Olympics in 
Mexico City, Mexico when Tommie Smith and John Carlos, winners of 
the gold and bronze medals in the 200-meter dash, respectively, stood on 
raised Olympic victory podiums with their heads bowed while each man 
extended his arm toward the sky as a symbol of black power.19 The 
imagery of the moment was deliberate and designed to bring attention to 
                                                                                                             
 13. Krishnadev Calamur, Muhammad Ali and Vietnam, ATLANTIC (June 4, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/muhammad-ali-vietnam 
/485717/ [https://perma.cc/AR87-PXR3]. 
 14. Id. Although Ali was sentenced to five years imprisonment, he never 
served a day in jail for draft evasion. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698 (1971). 
 17. See Justin Block, Muhammad Ali Risked It All When He Opposed The 
Vietnam War, HUFF. POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/muhammad-ali-
risked-it-all-when-he-opposed-the-vietnam-war_us_5751e545e4b0c3752dcda4ca 
(last updated June 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/FUM5-MUNV]. 
 18. David Remnick, a Pulitzer Prize-winning writer who authored the Ali 
biography King of the World, noted of the boxing champion’s stand against the 
Vietnam War: 
As he had before and would again, Ali had showed his gift for intuitive 
action, for speed, and this time he was acting in a way that would 
characterize the era itself, a resistance to authority, an insistence that 
national loyalty was not automatic or absolute. His rebellion, which 
started out as racial, now had widened in scope. 
DAVID REMNICK, KING OF THE WORLD: ALI AND THE RISE OF AN AMERICAN 
HERO 287 (1999). 
 19. TOMMIE SMITH & DAVID STEELE, SILENT GESTURE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
OF TOMMIE SMITH 173 (2007). 
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the unfair treatment of black people in the United States.20 Immediately 
after their display, the President21 of the International Olympic Committee 
(“IOC”) suspended Smith and Carlos from the United States National team 
and banned them from staying in the Olympic village for making a 
political statement in violation of the spirit of the Olympic Games.22 At 
the time of their display, the American sentiment regarding their actions 
was overwhelmingly negative.23 Time magazine characterized their 
conduct as a “public display of petulance that sparked one of the most 
unpleasant controversies in Olympic history and turned the high drama of 
the games into theater of the absurd.”24 Today, however, that negative 
                                                                                                             
 20. Tommie Smith and John Carlos’ Black Power salute at the 1968 
Olympics was a political demonstration.  
[Smith’s] raised right [black gloved fist] stood for black power in 
America. Carlos’s [raised] left [black gloved fist] stood for the unity of 
black America. Together they formed an arch of unity and power. The 
scarf around [Smith’s] neck stood for black pride. The black socks with 
no shoes stood for black poverty in racist America. The totality of our 
effort was the regaining of black dignity.  
Id. 
 21. Ironically, although Avery Brundage, President of the International 
Olympic Committee (“IOC”) in 1936 and prominent Nazi sympathizer during 
the 1936 Olympics, opined that Smith’s and Carlos’s actions were “a deliberate 
and violent breach of the fundamental principles of the Olympic spirit,” he did 
not express the same objection towards the Germans’ Nazi salutes during the 1936 
Olympics in Berlin. Brundage reasoned that Nazi salutes were acceptable because 
the salutes represented a national symbol of expression in a competition of nations 
but the black power salute was a salute of individual protest. Shirley Povich, 
Berlin, 1936: At the Olympics, Achievements of the Brave in a Year of Cowardice, 
WASH. POST (July 6, 1996), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/sports/long 
term/general/povich/launch/olympics.htm [https://perma.cc/73H8-K95Q]. In 
light of Brundage’s reasoning, at the time, his opinion was grossly inconsistent 
with the IOC Charter that consistently has provided that “the Olympic Games are 
competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between 
countries.” Int’l. Olympic Comm., Olympic Charter, ch. 1, r. 6, ¶ 1 (2015).  
 22. Initially, the United States Olympic Committee refused to send Smith 
and Carlos home; when the president of the IOC threatened to ban the entire 
U.S. track team, however, Carlos and Smith were expelled. MURRY R. NELSON, 
1 AMERICAN SPORTS: A HISTORY OF ICONS, IDOLS, AND IDEAS 132 (2013). 
 23. See Gary Younge, The Man Who Raised a Black Power Salute at the 1968 
Olympic Games, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world 
/2012/mar/30/black-power-salute-1968-olympics [https://perma.cc/WGZ5-S64J]. 
 24. The Olympics: Black Complaint, TIME (Oct. 25, 1968), http://content.time 
.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,900397,00.html (“‘Faster, Higher, Stronger’ is 
the motto of the Olympic Games. ‘Angrier, nastier, uglier’ better describes the scene 
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sentiment has changed. Smith and Carlos now are regarded as heroes who 
were central figures in the struggle for civil rights.25 
Much like Ali, Smith and Carlos were hated by a majority of the 
American public, and their actions were perceived as anti-American.26 It is 
difficult to think that a corporation could have restricted their right to speak 
on such important issues. Had Ali or Smith and Carlos been athletes today, 
their exercise of freedom of expression could have cost them several 
endorsement deals. Ali’s decision to defect served as a fundamental example 
of how to stand up for one’s ideals. Smith and Carlos brought the evils of 
racism in the United States to the social conscience of the world. Their actions 
forced the United States to rethink its treatment of black people to avoid the 
devaluation of its position as the primary dictator of morality. If the United 
States could not treat its own people with dignity and respect, its ability to 
encourage others to do the same would be undermined. 
Today, modern athletes and entertainers are central figures in the fight for 
justice. For example, both the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) and 
the National Football League (“NFL”) have taken strong positions against the 
discriminatory treatment of homosexuals.27 Many hip-hop artists and hip-hop 
                                                                                                             
in Mexico City last week. There, in the same stadium from which 6,200 pigeons 
swooped skyward to signify the opening of the ‘Peace Olympics,’ Sprinters 
Tommie Smith and John Carlos, two disaffected black athletes from the U.S. put on 
a public display of petulance that sparked one of the most unpleasant controversies 
in Olympic history and turned the high drama of the games into theater of the 
absurd.”) [https://perma.cc/B5BA-MDUB]. 
 25. William C. Rhoden, Sports of The Times; Vilified to Glorified: Olympic 
Redux, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/17/sports 
/othersports/vilified-to-glorified-olympic-redux.html (“In 1968, Smith and Carlos 
made one of the most courageous and enduring acts of sports demonstration in my 
lifetime, possibly in modern athletic history, when they raised black-gloved fists 
and bowed their heads on the victory stand at the Mexico City Olympic Games. The 
act was a profound gesture against oppression. Today at San Jose State University, 
their message will come full circle, 37 years later, with a daylong celebration that 
will end with the unveiling of a 24-foot bronze statue commemorating their Mexico 
City demonstration.”) [https://perma.cc/4QFW-DVH8].  
 26. Ben Cosgrove, Black Power Salute: Tommie Smith and John Carlos at the 
1968 Olympics, TIME (Sept. 27, 2014), http://time.com/3880999/black-power-
salute-tommie-smith-and-john-carlos-at-the-1968-olympics/ [https://perma.cc/Q6Z 
M-XC3X].  
 27. Hannah Withiam, Amar’e Stoudemire Under Fire for Gay ‘Joke’ Days 
After Tolerance Award, N.Y. POST (Feb. 28, 2017), http://nypost.com/2017 
/02/28/amare-stoudemire-under-fire-for-gay-joke-days-after-tolerance-award/  
(discussing how the former NBA player for the New York Knicks “jokingly” made 
homophobic comments in response to a reporter’s question about a hypothetical 
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personalities, including Jay-Z,28 Kanye West,29 and Russel Simmons,30 
actively participated in the Occupy Wall Street movement.31 The influence of 
                                                                                                             
homosexual teammate) [https://perma.cc/C4PQ-GXK5]. This comment followed 
days after receiving the Martin Luther King Jr. Award, “championing his efforts to 
promote diversity and tolerance.” Earlier in 2012, the league fined Stoudemire 
$50,000 for using a homophobic slur against a disgruntled fan who messaged the 
player about his game performance. Id. 
 28. Shawn Corey Carter, also known as Jay-Z, is an award-winning hip-hop 
recording artist and business man. Growing up in the drug-infested Macy Projects 
of New York City, Jay-Z fell victim to the drug, gun violence, and gang culture. 
At an early age, he turned to rap to escape the social ills plaguing his community. 
In 1996, he joined Roc-a-Fella records and released his debut album, Reasonable 
Doubt. Throughout the years, Jay-Z has released a slew of No. 1 albums and hit 
singles. Over the years, he has expanded his brand, starting his own clothing line, 
Roc-a-Wear, headed his own entertainment management business, Roc Nation, 
and launched Tidal, a music streaming service. Biography of Jay Z, BIOGRAPHY, 
http://www.biography.com/people/jay-z-507696 (last visited May 21, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/L427-L2BD]. 
 29. Kanye West is a Grammy Award-winning rapper, record producer, and 
fashion designer. Growing up in Chicago, Kanye was drawn to the South-side’s 
hip-hop scene and began producing for local artists. After moving to New York 
in 2001, he got his big break when he produced the track “This Can’t Be Life” for 
Jay-Z. He transitioned from behind the scenes to a reputable hip-hop artist after 
the release of his well-received debut album, College Dropout. Shortly after its 
release, Kanye began his own record label, GOOD Music. His sophomore album, 
Late Registration, debuted at No. 1 on the Billboard Hot 200—a feat West would 
repeat with every subsequent solo album release. Biography of Kanye West, 
BIOGRAPHY, http://www.biography.com/people/kanye-west-362922 (last visited 
May 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/X849-ZGLP]. 
 30. Hip-hop mogul and co-founder of Def Jam Records, Russell Simmons 
was the force behind the hip-hop revolution. He began his career by promoting 
and managing hip hop artists such as LL Cool J, the Beastie Boys, Public Enemy, 
Kurtis Blow, and Run DMC. Biography of Russell Simmons, BIOGRAPHY, 
https://www.biography.com/people/russell-simmons-307186 (last visited Sept. 
15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WP85-MYRL]. 
 31. Randy Roper, Russell Simmons, Jay-Z Planning Occupy Wall Street Concert, 
HIP-HOP WIRED (Nov. 22, 2011, 11:57 AM), http://hiphopwired.com/2011/11 
/22/russell-simmons-jay-z-planning-occupy-wall-street-concert/ [https://perma.cc/Y 
LK7-QYQN]. The Occupy Wall Street Movement was a social movement for 
economic justice. The movement largely was motivated by the concern that 99% of 
the United States’s wealth is concentrated in the hands of the richest one percent of 
Americans. See Heather Gautney, What is Occupy Wall Street? The history of 
leaderless movements, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2011), https://www.washington 
post.com/national/on-leadership/what-is-occupy-wall-street-the-history-of-leaderless 
-movements/2011/10/10/gIQAwkFjaL_story.html?utm_term=.614d11c701e7 
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athletes and entertainers is vitally important in bringing matters of public 
concern to the attention of the masses. Often, the attention of these individuals 
can effectuate legitimate and positive change. 
Although a company clearly has a right to use morals clauses and a vested 
interest in doing so to protect its brand image and goodwill, morals clauses 
should not trammel political and thought-provoking expression unreasonably. 
When an athlete enters into an endorsement contract, there is clearly an 
agreement wherein the athlete has an obligation to promote the brand name 
of the company; such agreements, however, should not be construed liberally 
to allow an organization to treat the endorser as a pawn. This Article does not 
suggest that two parties cannot contract to limit, restrict, or prohibit certain 
types of speech. Rather, this Article argues that certain types of speech are so 
germane in expanding moral foundation that such speech should not be 
restricted unreasonably. This Article advocates for a burden-shifting 
framework that fairly balances the interests of the athlete-endorser, the 
corporation, and the public in deciding the enforceability of morals clauses 
that attempt to censor thought-provoking or political speech. Under the 
existing framework, once a corporation terminates an athlete-endorser’s 
contract pursuant to the corporation’s unilateral determination that the athlete-
endorser’s conduct violates the contract’s morals clause, the athlete-endorser 
bears the burden of establishing that the corporation’s termination amounts to 
a breach of the contract. Conversely, pursuant to the approach advanced in 
this Article, once a plaintiff successfully establishes that his speech is thought-
provoking or political in nature,32 a presumption arises that his speech is 
protected and his endorsement contract cannot be terminated for such speech. 
The corporation can rebut this presumption by proving that the plaintiff-
endorser’s speech is in direct contravention to the purpose of the endorsement 
contract; the plaintiff-endorser’s expression has a direct and negative effect 
on the corporation’s goodwill or brand image; or the contract includes a clause 
that is tailored narrowly to prohibit the specific speech expressed by the 
plaintiff-endorser.33 If a corporation is unable to meet its burden, termination 
of the endorsement contract by the corporation will result in a breach of the 
implied obligation of good faith or violate public policy. This approach is 
different from the existing framework because it more fairly allocates the 
burden of proof by placing more of it on the corporation when the corporation 
terminates an athlete-endorser for engaging in thought provoking or political 
expression.  
                                                                                                             
[https://perma.cc/U952-A857].  
 32. See discussion infra Part VI.  
 33. See discussion infra Part VI.  
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Part I of this Article chronicles the development and creation of the 
morals clause as a means to curb various types of expression. Part II provides 
a comprehensive background and historical context of the development of the 
implied obligation of good faith. Part III explains how public policy 
considerations influence the enforceability of some contracts. Part IV 
analyzes the Rashard Mendenhall case that brought the issue of discretionary 
enforcement of morals clauses to light. Part V highlights the perils of 
providing corporations with the power to exercise their own discretion in 
unilaterally determining whether an athlete-endorser’s conduct is morally 
reprehensible. Part VI provides a resolution to this problem and explains how 
the solution presented in this Article strikes a fairer balance between the 
interests of society, the endorser, and the corporation. Finally, Part VII 
discusses the various types of speech that are protected by the First 
Amendment and how, by analogy, First Amendment jurisprudence can be 
used to determine what types of speech should be protected contractually.  
I. MORALS CLAUSES 
A morals clause is a contractual provision that allows one party the right 
to terminate an agreement based on conduct the party deems morally 
reprehensible.34 Morals clauses have existed for almost 100 years and first 
began to appear in contracts in the early 1920s.35 Roscoe “Fatty” Arbuckle 
was the impetus for the creation of what the law now recognizes as a morals 
clause.36 Arbuckle was a silent film comedian and actor in the early 1920s 
whose services were in high demand until he was arrested and charged with 
the murder of actress Virginia Rappe.37 The facts surrounding the incident 
largely were disputed. According to Arbuckle, 
[W]hen he retired to his room to change clothes, he found Rappe 
vomiting in his bathroom. He then helped clean her up and led her to 
a nearby bed to rest. Thinking she was just overly intoxicated, he left 
                                                                                                             
 34. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 351 (“[A] morals clause is a 
contractual provision that gives one contracting party (usually a company) the 
unilateral right to terminate the agreement, or take punitive action against the 
other party (usually an individual whose endorsement or image is sought) in the 
event that such other party engages in reprehensible behavior or conduct that may 
negatively impact his or her public image and, by association, the public image of 
the contracting company.”). 
 35. Id. at 353–54. 
 36. Id. at 354–55. 
 37. Jude Sheerin, ‘Fatty’ Arbuckle and Hollywood’s first scandal, BBC NEWS 
(Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-14640719 [https://perma 
.cc/7MFR-BUU3]. 
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her to rejoin the party. When he returned to the room just a few 
minutes later, he found Rappe on the floor. After putting her back on 
the bed, he left the room to get help.38 
At least one witness contended that Arbuckle raped Ms. Rappe and then left 
her in his room to die.39 The media followed Arbuckle’s trial very closely and 
several of them reported that Arbuckle crushed Ms. Rappe with his body 
weight during the alleged sexual encounter.40 Others reported, in graphic 
detail, that he penetrated her with a foreign object.41 The case was tried three 
times.42 The first two cases ended in hung juries.43 The jury deliberations of 
the third trial only lasted a few minutes before the jury returned a not guilty 
verdict.44 The jury also issued Arbuckle the following apology: 
Acquittal is not enough for Roscoe Arbuckle. We feel that a great 
injustice has been done him. We feel also that it was our only plain 
duty to give him this exoneration. There was not the slightest proof 
adduced to connect him in any way with the commission of a crime. 
He was manly throughout the case and told a straightforward story 
on the witness stand, which we all believed. The happening at the 
hotel was an unfortunate affair for which Arbuckle, so the evidence 
shows, was in no way responsible. We wish him success and hope 
that the American people will take the judgment of fourteen men and 
women who have sat listening for thirty-one days to the evidence that 
Roscoe Arbuckle is entirely innocent and free from all blame.45 
Despite the final disposition of the case, Arbuckle’s career was ruined as some 
people refused to believe his innocence; as a result, the movie industry 
blacklisted him.46 In response to this situation, many Hollywood studios 
began inserting morals clauses in their contracts.47 
                                                                                                             
 38. See Jennifer Rosenberg, The “Fatty” Arbuckle Scandal, THOUGHTCO., 
https://www.thoughtco.com/fatty-arbuckle-scandal-1779625 (last visited Aug. 
17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5FWW-5MN8].  
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 355. 
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Around the same time of the Fatty Arbuckle disaster, Babe Ruth48 was 
drawing the ire of the New York Yankees franchise for his night life activities49 
and his frequent drinking. As a result of his opprobrious behavior, New York 
Yankees owner Colonel Jake Ruppert required that Ruth sign one of the first 
clauses attempting to curb an athlete’s erratic and irresponsible behavior in an 
effort to protect the brand image of a franchise.50 The provision in Ruth’s 
agreement provided, in relevant part, that he was to 
refrain and abstain entirely from the use of intoxicating liquors and that 
he shall not during the training and playing season in each year stay up 
later than 1 o’clock A.M. on any day without the permission and 
consent of the Club’s manager, and it is understood and agreed that if 
at any time during the period of this contract, whether in the playing 
season or not, the player shall indulge in intoxicating liquors or be 
guilty of any action or misbehavior which may render him unfit to 
perform the services to be performed by him hereunder, the Club may 
cancel and terminate this contract and retain as the property of the Club, 
any sums of money withheld from the player's salary as above 
provided.51 
This provision was not technically a morals clause because the Yankees did not 
have an express right to terminate his contract for morally reprehensible 
conduct.52 Instead, this provision merely allowed the Yankees to terminate 
Ruth’s contract if he indulged in intoxicating liquors, criminal activity, or any 
                                                                                                             
 48. Baseball icon Babe Ruth set numerous records as a pitcher and slugging 
outfielder. He was among the first five players inducted into the sport’s Hall of 
Fame. Biography of Babe Ruth, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/people 
/babe-ruth-9468009 (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/93NU-7A3Q]. 
 49. Ruth has been described as a glutton, womanizer, spendthrift, heavy 
drinker, and smoker. Ruth also regularly collected speeding tickets, broke team 
curfews, and engaged in fist fights with umpires, fans, and teammates. See 10 
Things You May Not Know About Babe Ruth, HISTORY (July 11, 2014), 
http://www.history.com/news/10-things-you-may-not-know-about-babe-ruth  
[https://perma.cc/L3D4-EZFX]. Apparently recognizing the problems that Ruth’s 
off-the-field behavior could cause for a baseball team in an age of increased media 
coverage, the New York Yankees introduced a clause similar to a morals clause 
into Ruth’s playing contract in 1922. See Fernando M. Pinguelo, Timothy D. 
Cedrone & Porcher Taylor, The Reverse-Morals Clause: The Unique Way to Save 
Talent’s Reputation and Money in a New Era of Corporate Crimes And Scandals, 
28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 65, 75 (2010). 
 50. DAVID A. MARK, HIDDEN HISTORY OF MAYNARD 99 (2014). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5. 
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other activity that rendered him unable to play baseball.53 In contrast, a morals 
clause is broader because it provides an express right to terminate the contract 
when the athlete does something that the corporation believes is morally 
unacceptable.54 
During the McCarthy Era55 of the 1940s and 1950s, morals clauses often 
were used as a means to “censor political conduct and expression rather than 
challenge immoral conduct.”56 Because of American fears about the spread of 
communism, Congress created the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities (“HUAC”) in 1938 “to investigate alleged disloyalty and subversive 
activities on the part of private citizens, public employees, and those 
organizations suspected of having communist ties.”57 Committee members of 
HUAC were interested particularly in the Hollywood film industry because it 
was perceived as an incubator for possible communist activity.58 This 
perception was based on two assumptions.59 First, as a result of the Great 
Depression and the economic difficulties it created, HUAC members opined 
that struggling actors and studio workers would be more vulnerable to bribes 
from the Communist Party.60 Second, HUAC members believed that the movie 
industry would be attractive to communist supporters as a “source of subversive 
propaganda.”61 As a result, in 1947, HUAC unleashed a massive attack on the 
movie industry by serving subpoenas on more than 40 individuals in the 
industry, requiring that they appear before the committee for investigative 
purposes.62 Out of this number, ten refused to cooperate with HUAC and 
                                                                                                             
 53. Pinguelo, Cedrone & Taylor, supra note 49, at 75–76. 
 54. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 357. 
 55. The McCarthy Era refers to a period in which companies would use morals 
clauses to stifle political speech. The term “McCarthyism” was coined in reference 
to the anti-communism practices of United States Senator Joseph McCarthy fueled 
by tensions surrounding the Cold War. See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: 
THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE (1990). The phrase also refers to President 
Truman’s Executive Order 9835 that “required that all federal civil service 
employees be screened for ‘loyalty.’” Robert J. Goldstein, Prelude to McCarthyism: 
The Making of a Blacklist, 38 PROLOGUE MAG. (2006), https://www.archives.gov 
/publications/prologue/2006/fall/agloso.html [https://perma.cc/GA22-XV6F]. 
 56. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 355. 
 57. House Un-American Activities Committee, GEO. WASH. UNIV., 
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/huac.cfm (last visited Aug. 
17, 2017) [https://perma.cc/VC9J-AEDM]. 
 58. Hollywood Ten, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/holly 
wood-ten (last visited May 21, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9S95-8EYX]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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declined to answer whether they had an affiliation with the Communist Party, 
claiming that they had a First Amendment right to associate with whomever they 
desired.63 These individuals became known as the Hollywood Ten.64 Because of 
their refusal to cooperate, they were cited by the House of Representatives for 
contempt of Congress.65 As a result, many of the Hollywood Ten were blacklisted 
by Hollywood studios.66 Additionally, many of the studios invoked the morals 
clauses contained in these individuals’ contracts to terminate their employment.67 
Based on these terminations, three of the Hollywood Ten brought lawsuits against 
the studios for breach of contract.68 
In the first case of the trilogy, Loew’s Inc. v. Cole, Lester Cole was terminated 
pursuant to the morals clause contained in his employment agreement after he 
refused to answer adequately whether he was a communist before HUAC.69 The 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. (“The 10 individuals who defied HUAC were Alvah Bessie (c. 1904-
85), Herbert Biberman (1900-71), Lester Cole (c. 1904-85), Edward Dmytryk 
(1908-99), Ring Lardner Jr. (1915-2000), John Howard Lawson (1894-1977), 
Albert Maltz (1908-1985), Samuel Ornitz (1890-1957), Robert Adrian Scott 
(1912-73) and Dalton Trumbo (1905-76).”).  
 65. ROBERT H. STANLEY, THE CELLULOID EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY 130–31 (1978). 
 66. Arthur Eckstein, The Hollywood Ten in history and memory, 16 FILM 
HISTORY: AN INT’L J. 424, 427 (2004). The blacklisting occurred both officially and 
unofficially. Officially, it occurred through a “joint public announcement of the 
motion picture firms in November 1947 that henceforth no studio would knowingly 
employ any member of the Communist Party, or the members of any other group 
which advocated the overthrow of the United States government by revolution.” Id. 
at 424. Unofficially, it occurred through media publications that openly identified 
individuals having alleged communist ties and through an elimination of job 
opportunities for such individuals. Id. 
 67. See Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 649 (9th Cir. 1950); Twentieth 
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954); Scott v. RKO 
Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1957). 
 68. See Loew’s, 185 F.2d 641; Lardner, 216 F.2d 844; Scott, 240 F.2d 87. 
 69. Loew’s, 185 F.2d at 645. The morals clause provided: 
The employee agrees to conduct himself with due regard to public 
conventions and morals, and agrees that he will not do or commit any 
act or thing that will tend to degrade him in society or bring him into 
public hatred, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or that will tend to shock, 
insult or offend the community or ridicule public morals or decency, 
or prejudice the producer or the motion picture, theatrical or radio 
industry in general.  
Id. 
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jury resolved a form of special verdict,70 containing four questions, in Cole’s 
favor.71 The trial court affirmed the jury’s determination that Loew’s, Inc. 
(“Loew’s”) breached Cole’s employment contract.72 The court of appeals 
reversed the trial court’s decision and disagreed with all of the trial court’s 
holdings.73 In regards to the trial court’s first holding, the court of appeals held 
that Cole’s refusal to answer gave the public the general perception that he 
was a member of the Communist Party.74 Because such association, in 1947, 
largely was considered un-American and morally reprehensible, there were 
sufficient facts to establish that Cole engaged in conduct that contravened his 
employment agreement.75 In regards to the trial court’s second holding, the 
                                                                                                             
 70. A special verdict form limits the discretion of the jury in deciding a case 
only to those questions identified on the form. After deliberating, the jury provides 
responses to specific questions of fact. Thereafter, the court applies the jury’s 
factual determinations to the relevant law to determine the prevailing party. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 49(a).  
 71. Loew’s, 185 F.2d at 646. The special verdict form contained the following 
four questions: 
Question 1: Did the plaintiff Lester Cole by his statements and conduct 
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in connection 
with the hearing held by said Committee, bring himself or tend to bring 
himself into public hatred, contempt, scorn, or ridicule? (Answer ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’.) Answer: No. 
Question 2: Did the plaintiff Lester Cole, by his statements and conduct 
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in connection 
with the hearing held by said Committee, tend to shock, insult or offend 
the community? (Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.) Answer: No. 
Question 3: Did the plaintiff Lester Cole, by his statements and conducts 
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in connection 
with the hearing held by said Committee, prejudice the defendant Loew’s 
Incorporated as his employer or the motion picture industry generally? 
(Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.) Answer: No. 
Question 4: Did the defendant Loew’s Incorporated by its conduct 
towards the plaintiff, subsequent to the hearing, waive the right to 
take action against him by suspending him? (Answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.) 
Answer: Yes. 
Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 644. 
 74. Id. at 649. 
 75. Id. The court also opined that Cole’s intentional failure to answer HUAC’s 
questions about his communist involvement might be considered a breach of the 
morals clause because such refusal would be considered a misdemeanor. The court 
noted that the morals clause provided that Cole “shall act ‘with due regard to public 
conventions.’” Such provision “required more than a mere requirement of obedience 
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court of appeals disagreed and held that the employer’s conduct of expressing 
a disdain for HUAC’s investigative processes and procedures did not amount 
to an approval of Cole’s decision to abstain from answering questions 
regarding his communist ties.76 More specifically, the court held that  
[t]he conduct of the employer during this period adds up to an attitude 
of definite hostility and unfriendliness to the Committee hearings, 
which the producers apparently feared was headed in the direction of 
censorship of the screen. Thus Cole may have felt that he was 
justified in carrying a torch for freedom of speech, and in protesting 
against the proceedings. But we cannot think that as a matter of law 
this gave him the implied consent of the employer to go so far as to 
subject himself to a misdemeanor charge.77 
According to the court of appeals, the trial court erred on this issue because it 
focused solely on the fact that Loew’s made “no effort to warn or advise Cole 
as to how he should conduct himself.”78 The employer, however, had no such 
duty because  
it might well have subjected itself to criticism by the Committee had 
it undertaken to do so. Had it been disclosed at the hearing that Cole 
had received instructions as to how to testify, Loew's might well 
expect to be charged with an improper effort to exert its power as an 
employer to induce the witness to slant his testimony.79 
Regarding the trial court’s third and final holding, the court of appeals again 
reversed, holding that Loew’s did not waive its right to terminate the contract 
by continuing to employ Cole after his testimony before HUAC.80 Although 
Loew’s was aware of Cole’s failure to answer at the HUAC hearing, the court 
concluded that Loew’s did not have a full appreciation for the effect that 
Cole’s conduct would have on its reputation and goodwill.81 As such, Loew’s 
acquiescence to Cole’s continued employment was not a waiver of the morals 
clause.82 Moreover, even if Loew’s in fact was aware of the effect that Cole’s 
                                                                                                             
to [the] law . . . it necessarily include[d] an agreement to refrain from the commission 
of a misdemeanor of this character.” Id. 
 76. Id. at 649–50. 
 77. Id. at 653. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 655–56. 
 81. Id. at 656. 
 82. Id. 
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conduct would have on its reputation and goodwill, Loew’s still maintained a 
reasonable time upon which to effectuate the termination.83 
The second and third cases of the Hollywood Ten trilogy, Twentieth 
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner84 and Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,85 
ruled in favor of the studios by relying on the Cole precedent that  
the natural result of the artist's refusal to answer the committee's 
questions was that the public would believe he was a Communist, 
and because a large segment of the public thought Communism was 
evil, the artist violated the express morals clause by failing to comport 
with public conventions and morals.86 
The facts of the second case in the trilogy, Lardner, were substantially 
similar to those of Cole.87 Much like Cole, Ring Lardner was a member of the 
Hollywood Ten who was terminated by his employer, Twentieth Century-Fox 
Film Corporation (“Fox”), pursuant to the morals clause contained in his 
employment contract88 after he failed to answer adequately whether he was a 
Communist before HUAC.89 Lardner argued that he did not breach the 
contract but contended that if his conduct did amount to a breach, his breach 
was excused because Fox waived its right to discharge him by continuing to 
employ him for almost a month after his failure to testify and assigning him 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. 
 84. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1954). 
 85. Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1957). 
 86. Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A 
Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 245 (2005).  
 87. Lardner, 216 F.2d at 847. 
 88. Id. at 848. The morals clause contained in Lardner’s employment agreement 
was substantially similar to the morals clause contained in Cole’s contract; the morals 
clause in Lardner’s agreement, however, was a bit more comprehensive. The clause 
in Lardner’s agreement provided: 
The artist shall perform the services herein contracted for in the manner that 
shall be conducive to the best interests of the producer, and of the business 
in which the producer is engaged, and if the artist shall conduct himself, 
either while rendering such services to the producer, or in his private life in 
such a manner as to commit an offense involving moral turpitude under 
Federal, state or local laws or ordinances, or shall conduct himself in a 
manner that shall offend against decency, morality or shall cause him to be 
held in public ridicule, scorn or contempt, or that shall cause public scandal, 
then, and upon the happening of any of the events herein described, the 
producer may, at its option and upon one week’s notice to the artist, 
terminate this contract and the employment thereby created.  
Id. 
 89. Id. 
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to a new project.90 Much like Cole, the trial court found in favor of Lardner, 
holding that he did not breach the contract, but if he did breach, Fox waived 
its right to terminate.91 On the issue of breach of contract, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that Lardner’s conduct clearly provided 
no benefit to Fox and actually hurt Fox’s brand image because of society’s 
negative perception of communism at the time.92 As for Lardner’s waiver 
argument, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision on that issue 
as well and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination as to 
whether Fox had waived its right to terminate Lardner.93 
The facts of the third and final case in the Hollywood Ten trilogy, Scott 
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., were substantially similar to the facts of both 
Cole and Lardner, with one distinction: the trial court ruled against Scott, 
holding that RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. (“RKO”) was justified in terminating 
Scott because his conduct harmed RKO’s brand image.94 In addition, there 
was no evidence that RKO waived its right to enforce the termination 
provision.95 
Since the McCarthy Era and the Hollywood Ten Trilogy, the primary use 
of morals clauses has shifted from being used to attack the political ideologies 
of the athlete to curbing immoral conduct and protecting corporate brand 
                                                                                                             
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 851. 
 93. Id. at 853. In instructing the trial court on remand, the court of appeals 
indicated that it was to determine whether Fox made any affirmations or engaged in 
any conduct that would lead Lardner reasonably to believe that Fox waived its right 
to terminate. Id. In addition, the jury was required to ascertain when Fox was fully 
knowledgeable about the extent to which Lardner’s conduct harmed the brand image 
of Fox. Id. Once Fox was aware of the extent of the harm, it had a reasonable time 
thereafter upon which to terminate Lardner’s contract. Id. 
 94. Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1957). The 
morals clause in Scott’s contract provided that  
[a]t all times commencing on the date hereof and continuing throughout 
the production or distribution of the pictures, the producer will conduct 
himself with due regard to the public conventions and morals and will not 
do anything which will tend to degrade him in society or bring him into 
public disrepute, contempt, scorn or ridicule, or that will tend to shock, 
insult or offend the community or public morals or decency or prejudice 
the corporation or the motion picture industry in general; and he will not 
willfully do any act which will not wilfully [sic] his capacity fully to 
comply with this agreement, or which will injure him physically or 
mentally. 
Id. at 87–88. 
 95. Id. at 91.  
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image.96 A 1997 survey conducted by Sports Media Challenge, a Charlotte-
based sports communication and image management company, “estimated that 
nearly half of all endorsement deals had morals clauses included.”97 As of 2003, 
industry experts estimated that morals clauses were included in at least 75% of 
all endorsement agreements.98 Currently, the collective bargaining agreements 
of the NBA,99 NFL,100 NHL,101 and MLB102 all contain morals clauses in their 
standard player contracts. The reach of the morals clause, however, is not 
limited to the sports and entertainment industries. Morals clauses often are 
                                                                                                             
 96. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 356. 
 97. Eric Fisher, Sosa Flap to Change Endorsement Deals, WASH. TIMES 
(June 28, 2003), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/jun/8/20030608-
124400-6755r/ [https://perma.cc/87FZ-D6ZF]. 
 98. Id. 
 99. NAT’L BASKETBALL ASS’N, UNIFORM PLAYER CONTRACT (2011), 
http://blog.techprognosis.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/NBA_Constitution.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4BP-9XDJ]. Pursuant to Section 16(a)(i) of this Agreement, a team 
may terminate a player’s contract upon written notice if the player “at any time, fail[s], 
refuse[s], or neglect[s] to conform his personal conduct to standards of good 
citizenship, good moral character (defined here to mean not engaging in acts of moral 
turpitude, whether or not such acts would constitute a crime).” Id. § 16(a)(i). 
 100. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 256 app. 
A (2011), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-
agreement-2011-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T7D-3LWL]. Pursuant to Section 
11 of the NFL Player Contract found in Appendix A of the Agreement, if a player 
“has engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by Club to adversely affect 
or reflect on Club, then Club may terminate this contract.” Id. § 11. 
 101. NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ 
ASSOCIATION (2013), http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_20 
13_CBA.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CMU-9RMY]. Pursuant to section 2(e) of the 
Stand Player’s Contract found in Exhibit 1 of the Agreement, the player agrees 
“to conduct himself on and off the rink according to the highest standards of 
honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship, and to refrain from conduct 
detrimental to the best interest of the Club, the League or professional hockey 
generally.” Id. § 2(e). 
 102. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, BASIC AGREEMENT 337 app. A (2017), 
http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450407.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP4H-R759]. 
Pursuant to section 7(b)(1) of this agreement, a Club may terminate if the Player 
shall at any time: “fail, refuse or neglect to conform his personal conduct to the 
standards of good citizenship and good sportsmanship or to keep himself in first-
class physical condition or to obey the Club’s training rules.” Id. § 7(b)(1). 
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included in contracts between corporations and high-ranking executive 
officers.103 
Although morals clauses traditionally have been used by the corporation 
to terminate a contractual relationship with an endorser, according to some 
scholars, there has been a recent proliferation of “reverse morals clauses.”104 
Reverse morals clauses operate much the same way as traditional morals 
clauses except that they are used by the endorser as a shield to protect the 
endorser from immoral conduct by the corporation.105 Pat Boone106 negotiated 
the first contract containing a reverse morals clause.107 After Boone’s first 
entertainment contract with Dot records108 was set to expire, Boone became a 
born-again Christian and was worried about resigning with Dot because of 
concerns about its strategy for marketing some of its other artists.109 As a 
result, prior to resigning, 
Boone considered reneging, upset over cover art for the [Bill Cosby] 
label’s other new release: nude pictures of John Lennon and Yoko 
                                                                                                             
 103. Pinguelo & Cedrone, supra note 5, at 364 (finding that a significant 
number of executive contracts contain provisions that allow a corporation to 
terminate the agreement for acts of moral turpitude (referencing Stewart J. 
Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment 
Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 
233, 248–49 (2006))). 
 104. See Pinguelo, Cedrone & Taylor, supra note 49, at 66. 
 105. Id. at 66–67 (“[A] reverse morals clause is a reciprocal contractual 
warranty to a traditional morals clause intended to protect the reputation of talent 
from the negative, unethical, immoral, and/or criminal behavior of the endorsee-
company or purchaser of talent’s endorsement. Such a clause gives talent the 
reciprocal right to terminate an endorsement contract based on such defined 
negative conduct.”). 
 106. Charles Eugene “Pat” Boone was a successful pop singer with a wholesome, 
squeaky-clean image in the United States during the 1950s and early 1960s. He was 
a music chart rival of Elvis Presley and sold more than 45 million records, had 38 top-
40 hits, 54 chart appearances, and appeared in more than 12 Hollywood films. Jason 
Ankeny, Pat Boone, Biography, ALLMUSIC, http://www.allmusic.com/artist/pat-
boone-mn0000131681/biography (last visited Sept. 11, 2017) [https://perma.cc/26U 
X-8SUP].  
 107. Pinguelo, Cedrone & Taylor, supra note 49, at 79. 
 108. Dot records was a prominent pop label from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s 
that focused on gospel, doo-wop, country, and vocal pop music. Scott Borchetta, 
Chris Stacey on the Relaunch of Dot Records, Big Machine’s Latest Imprint, 
BILLBOARD (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/record-
labels/5944866/scott-borchetta-chris-stacey-on-the-relaunch-of-dot-records  
[https://perma.cc/TH8Z-3LCR].  
 109. Pinguelo, Cedrone & Taylor, supra note 49, at 79. 
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Ono on the Two Virgins album. After much prayer, Boone, ready to 
opt out of the deal, met with label executives. They were sympathetic 
to his religious concerns and agreed to a “reverse morals clause”— 
Boone’s contract would lapse if the record company, not the 
performer, did something unseemly. Finally, it was agreed that no 
formal contract would be drawn up. This was fortunate for Boone, as 
a few months later the label went bust following [Bill] Cosby’s 
departure.110 
Even though the contract never was formally entered, Boone’s ability to 
negotiate such a favorable condition was predicated largely upon the 
magnitude of his celebrity at the time.111 
Although there are no reported cases to date that have interpreted the 
validity or viability of a reverse morals clauses, the Enron scandal,112 
according to many legal scholars, obviated the current need for endorsees to 
require the inclusion of such clauses. During the early 2000s, Enron, a 
Houston-based energy company specializing in the purchase and sale of 
natural gas, was wildly successful and created a brand image synonymous 
with success.113 As a result of its success, Enron was able to acquire a 30-year, 
$100 million deal for the right to name the Houston Astros’ baseball park.114 
The Astros were hoping that Enron would continue to operate as a profitable 
business entity and a company of high moral character and integrity.115 
Enron’s success, however, came crashing down after John Olson, an energy 
industry financial analyst, learned that Enron engaged in illegal business 
practices.116 As a result, Enron filed for bankruptcy and the Astros 
                                                                                                             
 110. Joseph Reiner, Pat Boone, ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.encyclopedia.com 
/doc/1G2-3493100014.html (last updated Sept. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5N4F-
KNN9]. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Susan Lee, Enron’s Success Story, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2001), https://www 
.wsj.com/articles/SB1009316351669886920 [https://perma.cc/HX67-J96U]. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Edward Wong, Astros’ Ballpark No Longer Enron Field, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 28, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/28/sports/baseball-astros-ball 
park-no-longer-enron-field.html [https://perma.cc/PXK8-K2GH]. 
 115. Id. 
 116. One of the primary illegal practices that Enron engaged in was the use of 
off balance sheet financing. The hidden liabilities allowed Enron to maintain the 
appearance of a rapidly growing, but financially stable, company until near the 
very end when bankruptcy was imminent. Enron’s financial arrangements were 
complicated and sometimes entailed transferring overvalued assets to partnerships 
that it had a controlling interest in but was not required to include on its own balance 
sheet. The partnerships, with minimal equity capital from outside investors, raised 
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organization sought a court order excusing it from complying with the naming 
rights agreement.117 Given Enron’s tarnished image, the Astros no longer 
wanted a reminder of Enron’s failures and questionable business practices 
memorialized in its stadium.118 When the Astros filed the court order, 
Enron actually had not yet breached its agreement to make payments on 
the naming rights deal; a breach was imminent, however, given Enron’s 
financial condition.119 Consequently, the Astros agreed to a buyout with 
Enron for $2.1 million.120 
To date, courts have used two mechanisms to evaluate the enforceability 
of a morals clause: (1) the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing; 
and (2) the public policy exception. Specifically, when endorsers seek to 
challenge a corporation’s discretion to terminate an endorsement deal, these 
doctrines are the primary mechanisms that are used to establish that the 
termination amounts to a breach of contract. Although both of these are 
viable options, they do not offer sufficient protection in their current 
iterations. Therefore, the following section provides a background for each 
mechanism and explains how the approach advocated by this Article more 
fairly balances the concerns highlighted herein. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED 
OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH 
Good faith is hardly a novel notion in American legal jurisprudence—
its conceptual roots can be traced back to Roman times.121 Despite good 
faith being a well-established concept in American common law 
                                                                                                             
most of their capital from loans using Enron stock, transferred assets, or pledges from 
Enron as collateral. See Bill Keller, Enron for Dummies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/26/opinion/enron-for-dummies.html [https://perma 
.cc/FCJ3-R778].  
 117. Wong, supra note 114. 
 118. See Astros Buy Back Rights to Enron Field Name, BUS. J. (Feb. 27, 2002), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2002/02/25/daily20.html [https://perma 
.cc/B47E-5KRR]. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. B. J. Reitier, Good Faith in Contract, 17 VAL. U. L. REV. 705, 708 (1983) 
(citing Raphael Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 16 
(1956); ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT ON SALE OF GOODS 163 
(1979); Michael J. Trebilcock, Good Faith in Sales Transactions, Research Paper 
No. II.3, 4–5 (Ontario Law Reform Comm’n Sale of Goods Project 1974)). 
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jurisprudence,122 the notion of the implied obligation of good faith did not 
develop until the second half of the 19th Century.123 Good faith is a 
judicially-created concept that is deemed to be implied in every contract.124 
It is important to note that the concept of “implying” terms was also a critical 
development of the second half of the 19th Century.125 
One of the first cases to imply a term into a contract that had yet to be 
negotiated by the parties was Wood v. Lucy.126 Although the court did not 
address specifically the issue of the implied obligation of good faith, the 
court’s holding in Wood evinces an example of the shift from Formalism 
to Realism. The Formalistic view, practiced during the first half of the 19th 
Century, applied abstract contract rules to resolve contractual disputes 
without considering factors outside of the agreement.127 Conversely, 
pursuant to the Realist view, courts were willing to substitute an agreement 
with terms not included by the parties while also considering factors 
beyond the four corners of the document.128 In Wood, Lucy entered into 
an endorsement deal with Wood wherein Lucy agreed to give Wood the 
exclusive right to market, license, and endorse all of her products.129 In 
exchange, Wood and Lucy were to split all of the profits from Wood’s 
efforts evenly.130 In light of these obligations, the actual agreement did not 
contain express language providing that Wood actually had to sell, market, 
license, or endorse.131 After entering into the agreement, Wood learned 
that Lucy had entered into an agreement with a large retailer wherein Lucy 
agreed to market and endorse a line of clothing for the masses.132 This 
agreement was in direct contravention of Lucy’s agreement with Wood.133 
                                                                                                             
 122. “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 123. Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract 
Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
559, 564 (2012). 
 124. Reitier, supra note 121, at 707–08. 
 125. Dubroff, supra note 123, at 559; see also id. at 559 n.1, for late 19th 
Century common law contracts cases in which the implied covenant of good faith 
was applied. 
 126. Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 127. Dubroff, supra note 123, at 567–68.  
 128. Id. at 571–72.  
 129. Wood, 118 N.E. at 214. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. 
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Wood brought suit against Lucy for breach.134 Lucy argued that the 
agreement lacked consideration and therefore was unenforceable because 
Wood had no obligation to do anything as the contract did not require 
specifically that he market, license, or endorse her products.135 Judge 
Cardozo ruled in favor of Wood, reasoning that there was consideration to 
support the contract.136 Cardozo reasoned that, in an exclusive endorsement 
contract, to give such contracts business efficacy, courts should imply an 
obligation to use reasonable efforts.137 
Approximately 16 years after Wood, the New York Court of Appeals 
decided Kirke la Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.,138 which is recognized 
as one of the earliest cases dealing with the implied obligation of good 
faith.139 In Kirke la Shelle, Kirke La Shelle (“Kirke”) entered into an 
agreement with Paul Armstrong (“Armstrong”) wherein Armstrong granted 
Kirke an exclusive right to perform and produce one of Armstrong’s 
plays.140 Kirke subsequently purchased the play from Armstrong and began 
to produce it.141 Sometime thereafter, Kirke was sued by a third party for 
copyright infringement.142 Armstrong had fraudulently sold the play to 
Kirke.143 As a result, Kirke sued and obtained a judgment against 
Armstrong for the amount Kirke spent in defending the infringement 
litigation and the money Kirke paid to Armstrong for the purchase of the 
play.144 Armstrong died shortly before the judgment was entered.145 Kirke 
attempted to satisfy the judgment against Armstrong’s estate but later 
learned that it was insolvent because Armstrong had transferred 
“practically all his plays and property to the . . . Paul Armstrong Company 
[(“PAC”)].”146 Kirke then brought suit against PAC and its attorney for 
fraud.147 The suit was settled, and, as part of the written agreement, Kirke 
was to receive one half of all the proceeds generated from rivals of the 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 215. 
 137. Id. at 214–15. 
 138. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933). 
 139. Dubroff, supra note 123, at 565. 
 140. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong, 173 A.D. 232, 233 (1916). 
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 142. Id. at 234. 
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 144. Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 164 (1933).  
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play,148 including monies generated from productions “on the road”149 or 
“in stock.”150 The agreement also prohibited PAC from entering into any 
future agreements that would affect title to the dramatic rights without 
Kirke’s prior approval.151 After reaching this settlement agreement, PAC 
sold the “talkie rights”152 of the play to another entity and declined to split the 
proceeds with Kirke.153 Kirke then brought suit alleging breach of contract.154 
Both parties conceded that “talkies” were commercially unknown at the time 
of the agreement and were not in contemplation of the parties.155 The trial 
court ruled in favor of PAC, reasoning that Kirke could not recover proceeds 
from the sale of the talkie rights because those rights were not in 
contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the agreement.156 
The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that there was an implied 
obligation on behalf of PAC not to “render valueless the right conferred by 
the contract.”157 The Kirke decision evidenced a desire to avoid the harsh 
consequences of the Formalist/Classical approach. 
The Formalist/Classical approach to the implied obligation of good faith 
focused primarily on the plain meaning or the four corners approach to 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. “Alias Jimmy Valentine” is a dramatization by the late Paul Armstrong, 
playwright, of the novel, A Retrieved Reformation, by the late O. Henry. PAUL 
ARMSTRONG, ALIAS JIMMY VALENTINE (1910). 
 149. Kirke was to receive one half of the monies generated by play companies 
that produced the play outside of New York. Kirke La Shelle, 188 N.E. at 164. 
 150. Kirk also would be entitled to monetary benefit from stock companies 
who performed the play regularly. Id. 
 151. Id. at 163. 
 152. A “talkie” was an early form of cinema; a movie synchronized with 
speech and sound. See Dave Kehr, When Hollywood Learned to Talk, Sing and 
Dance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/movies 
/homevideo/17kehr.html [https://perma.cc/PA3N-9DMZ]. 
 153. Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 163. 
 154. Id. at 164.  
 155. Id. at 165 
 156. Id. The trial court determined that the contract between the parties did not 
contemplate the production of the play in “talkies” because they were unknown 
at the time. Id.  
 157. Id. at 168. The court also was highly persuaded by the fact that PAC 
“breached the express covenant of the contract to refrain from making any 
agreement affecting the rights conveyed to Kirk without its approval.” Id. In light 
of this additional fact, it is unlikely that its absence would have affected the court’s 
holding given the court’s reference to Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N.Y.S. 633 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1914). As the court in Kirke La Shelle noted, Frohman was squarely on point 
with the case at bar but for the fact that the plaintiff in Frohman owed all the stages 
rights and that it dealt with silent motion pictures, not “talkies.” Id. at 167.  
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resolving contractual disputes whereby courts were limited in their 
resolution of contractual disputes to the documents embodying the contract. 
At the core of this view was the notion that the language of the parties’ 
contract should control and that, when interpreting and resolving contractual 
disputes, courts should focus on the perspective of the objectively 
reasonable person to best ensure fairness and, most importantly, consistency 
in results. The promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) 
was a critical step in the development of the concept of the implied 
obligation of good faith. Prior to its enactment, most jurisdictions 
approached contract law from the perspective of the Restatement First of 
Contracts and focused primarily on the expressed intent of the parties 
without regard to any implied terms.158 The UCC’s provision, however, that 
“[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith 
in its performance or enforcement”159 entrenched the implied obligation of 
good faith in contract law. This transition from looking only to the expressed 
intent of the parties to implying good faith into every contract occurred as a 
result of two developments: “one, language, because of its inherent ambiguity, 
cannot always express perfectly the actual agreement of the parties, and two, 
foreseeing all eventualities that may arise in contract performance is beyond 
the capacity of humans and gaps in contract provisions inevitably will 
arise.”160 As courts shifted from the Formalistic view of contract law to a 
Realist view, as codified in the Restatement Second of Contracts161 and the 
UCC, courts assumed increased levels of power to resolve contract disputes 
while considering “the context of an agreement—usage, course of dealing, 
course of performance, and other factors present in the relationship that gave 
rise to the agreement.”162 
As jurisprudence regarding the implied obligation proliferated, defining 
its application became difficult. As a result, scholars like Professor Robert 
Summers, co-author of the UCC, conceptualized that the implied obligation 
of good faith should be viewed as an “excluder” without a specific general 
meaning.163 Summers found it particularly troublesome to define good faith 
                                                                                                             
 158. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
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 160. Dubroff, supra note 123, at 562. 
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and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 816 (1982).  
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and, instead, focused his efforts on identifying examples of bad faith. In 
doing so, he identified four broad categories of bad faith: (1) bad faith in 
contract negotiation and formation; (2) bad faith in raising and resolving 
contract disputes; (3) bad faith in taking remedial action; and (4) bad faith 
in performance and enforcement.164 
A. Bad Faith in Contract Negotiation and Formation 
As Professor Summers noted, this category of bad faith arises in the 
following six scenarios: 
Negotiating without serious intent to contract, abusing the privilege 
to break off negotiations, entering into a contract without having the 
intent to perform, entering a deal recklessly disregarding 
prospective inability to perform, failing to disclose known defects 
in goods being sold, and taking undue advantage of superior 
bargaining power to strike an unconscionable bargain.165 
The subcategories identified in this section involve cases in which the 
parties deal with bad faith resulting from the relationship between the parties 
before the contract actually is formed. The typical example of this category 
involves a situation where parties have an “agreement to agree”; the 
agreement, however, never is consummated because of the failure of one of 
the parties to engage fairly.166  
                                                                                                             
 164. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the 
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968). 
 165. See id. at 220. 
 166. A recent example of this situation is Citigroup’s attempted acquisition of 
Wachovia in 2008. Although the case ultimately was settled, the following facts 
are indicative of the type of facts that implicate a breach of the implied obligation 
of good faith in the negotiation and formation of a contract in which one party 
does not intend seriously to enter an agreement. In summary, Citigroup and 
Wachovia reached an agreement in principle wherein Citigroup would acquire 
several of Wachovia’s businesses and assume some of Wachovia’s debt. Before 
the parties finalized a formal agreement, Citigroup and Wachovia executed an 
exclusivity agreement providing that Wachovia was contractually forbidden, 
among other things, to: (1) “enter into or participate in any discussions or 
negotiations with, furnish any information relating to Wachovia . . . [or] otherwise 
cooperate in any way with, or knowingly assist, participate in, facilitate or 
encourage any effort by, any third party that is seeking to make, or has made, an 
Acquisition Proposal”; or (2) “enter into any agreement in principle, letter of 
intent, term sheet, merger agreement, acquisition agreement, option agreement or 
other similar instrument relating to an Acquisition Proposal.” Immediately 
thereafter, Wachovia entered into negotiations with Wells Fargo and refused to 
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B. Bad Faith in Raising and Resolving Contract Disputes 
Bad faith in raising and resolving contract disputes generally deals with 
issues involving one party’s unfair or unreasonable actions in working to 
settle contractual disagreements or one party’s failure to work diligently to 
fulfill its obligations under the contract. In this category, Summers identified 
the following subcategories: (1) evasion of the spirit of the deal; (2) lack of 
diligence and slacking off; (3) willful rendering of only substantial 
performance; (4) abuse of power to specify terms; (5) abuse of power to 
determine compliance; and (6) interference with or failure to cooperate in 
the other party’s performance.167  
C. Bad Faith in taking Remedial Action 
This category of bad faith generally occurs in three contexts: a party (1) 
attempts to conjure up a dispute; (2) adopts an overreaching or “weaseling” 
                                                                                                             
negotiate with Citigroup. Wells Fargo ultimately reached an agreement to acquire 
Wachovia for more than $15 billion. Citigroup brought suit against Wachovia for 
failure to negotiate in good faith pursuant to the exclusivity agreement. See 
Complaint at 4, Citigroup, Inc. v. Wachovia Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 485 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (No. 08-Civ-8668). 
 167. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith, supra note 163, at 812. 
Although this list is fairly exhaustive, Empire Gas Corp. v Am. Bakeries Co. 
exemplifies the essence of the type of case highlighted by this category. In Empire 
Gas, American Bakeries planned to purchase conversion units to convert its fleet 
of vehicles from propane to gas. As a result, it entered into a four-year contract 
with American Bakeries in which Empire Gas agreed to provide all the gas that 
American Bakeries needed. After entering into the agreement, American Bakeries 
decided not to convert its fleet from propane to gas and failed to purchase any gas. 
As a result, Empire Gas brought suit, alleging that American Bakeries breached 
the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The court of appeals affirmed 
the decision of the trial court, ruling in Empire Gas’s favor. It reasoned that 
Empire Gas had established successfully that American Bakeries continued to 
own a fleet of approximately 3,000 trucks and possessed the financial capacity to 
purchase the conversion units, yet failed to do so. More importantly, American 
Bakeries failed to present any evidence justifying why it failed to purchase any of 
its requirements. Instead, American Bakeries argued that it was not in breach of 
the contract because it did not purchase the conversion equipment or the propane 
from anyone else and therefore was free to reduce its requirements to zero. Again, 
the court rejected this argument, opining that the implied obligation of good faith 
requires that a buyer avoid an arbitrary decision to decline to perform its 
requirements promise without some evidence to establish that such a decision is 
reasonable in light of the circumstances. See Empire Gas Corp. v. Am. Bakeries 
Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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interpretation and/or construction regarding the language of the contract;168 or 
(3) takes advantage of the other party in order to obtain a favorable 
settlement.169 These types of cases occur after the parties have entered into a 
contract but one of the parties acts in bad faith by attempting to get out of his 
responsibilities identified in the contract or when a party leverages his position 
to extract an unfair benefit. 
D. Bad Faith in Performance and Enforcement 
This category of bad faith typically occurs when a party acts unreasonably 
in attempting to seek a particular remedy. Cases that fall into this category 
involve situations in which a party abuses “the right to adequate assurances, 
wrongful refusal to accept delivery, willful failure to mitigate damages and 
abuse of power to terminate.”170 
In reflecting on each of Professor Summers’s categories and subcategories, 
it is clear that his conception of the implied obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing is rooted in notions of morality.171 
Good faith offers useful insight into the moral bases of contract, and 
more specifically, into the sources and nature of contractual 
obligation. Good faith can be seen as the primary basis of contract 
liability. It entails that contract obligations are seen to arise because 
we, as society, think that they should, and only so far as we think that 
they should. Contracts can be seen to be binding in much the same 
way as obligations of citizenship bind generally. The obligation to 
perform contracts should, therefore, arise from a number of bases.172 
 
Given that morality is a fundamental component of evaluating good faith in 
contracting, it is imperative that courts use the concept of good faith as a 
tool to prohibit unreasonable attempts to define morality in a homogenous 
and under inclusive manner. Good faith must promote freedom of 
expression, even when certain expression might be unpopular at the time it 
is spoken—unpopular expression is the very expression that often moves 
society towards a greater sense of understanding as well as a more just 
perspective. 
                                                                                                             
 168. See Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel v. United States, 150 F.2d 642, 644 (2d 
Cir. 1945). 
 169. Lingenfelder v. Wainwright, 15 S.W. 844, 848 (1891). Summers, The 
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III. CONTRACTS IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
The other mechanism that courts may employ to limit the application 
of an overly restrictive or unreasonable morals clause is the public policy 
exception to enforcement of a contract. One of the primary arguments 
against restricting a corporation’s right to determine the morality of an 
endorser’s expression focuses on a fundamental tenet of contract law—the 
idea of “freedom of contract.” Freedom of contract is a legal doctrine that 
argues that the law should not operate to invalidate agreements freely 
entered into by an endorser and a corporation, especially considering that 
both of these parties likely are to be represented by counsel.173 Although 
this is a compelling point, freedom of contract is constrained when the 
contract violates public policy. The public policy defense to enforcement 
of a contract has been applied in several contexts.174 
First, the public policy defense can arise when a statute exists that 
makes a contract unenforceable because the contract contravenes the 
purpose of the statute. In these cases, whether the court will enforce a 
contract that violates a statute often depends on whether the statute is 
regulatory or revenue-raising.175 When a contract violates a revenue-
raising statute, courts are more willing to enforce the contract because the 
primary purpose of the statute is to raise money, not to curb “bad” 
behavior.176 When a contract violates a regulatory statute, courts likely will 
not enforce such contracts because the purpose of the statute is to prohibit 
conduct that is harmful to society, not primarily to raise money.177 
Fitzsimons v. Eagle Brewing Co. provides a useful illustration of how courts 
have declined to apply the idea of freedom of contract when the contract 
violates public policy in the context of a regulatory statute.178 In Fitzsimons, 
a defendant beer manufacturing company entered into a contract with a 
plaintiff company that produced malt syrup, a key ingredient in the 
production of beer.179 When the parties formed the contract, the plaintiff was 
aware that the defendant did not possess a proper license to sell beer; 
nonetheless, the plaintiff delivered the syrup, enabling the defendant to 
                                                                                                             
 173. See generally Jerome C. Knowlton, Comment, Freedom of Contract, 3 
MICH. L. REV. 619 (1905). 
 174. See Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
679 (1935). 
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 179. Id. at 712.  
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manufacture beer in violation of the statute.180 The plaintiff sued when the 
defendant ultimately breached the contract and refused to pay for the 
syrup.181 The district court ruled that the contract was unenforceable because 
the parties were in pari delicto,182 and the court of appeals affirmed, refusing 
to enforce the contract because it violated a public policy requiring liquor-
producers to be licensed.183 
Second, some courts are reluctant to enforce surrogacy agreements 
when the agreement looks like it is nothing more than a transaction for the 
sale of a child or when the agreement is not in the best interest of the 
child.184  
In addition to the aforementioned examples, there are other contexts 
in which courts are unwilling to enforce contracts based on important 
public policy concerns. Courts generally are reluctant to enforce contracts 
in which a party agrees to an assignment of future wages185 or when a 
contract includes a restrictive covenant that hinders a party from providing 
professional services.186 
These cases highlight the fact that the concept of “freedom to contract” 
is not an unbridled right. Courts and legislatures are willing to restrain this 
right when it trammels upon more compelling public interests, even when 
contracting parties are sophisticated, specifically intend for a particular 
result to occur at the time of contracting, or have consulted and/or retained 
legal counsel during the contract negotiation process. In each of these 
cases, the parties either had the assistance of counsel or contracted freely 
and voluntarily, yet the court declined to enforce these contracts because 
there was an overarching concern of protecting the public and ensuring 
that two independent parties could not frustrate the needs of society. 
                                                                                                             
 180. Id. at 712–13. 
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Morals clauses that seek to limit free speech rights similarly frustrate this 
purpose. 
IV. THE RASHARD MENDENHALL CASE 
The Rashard Mendenhall case served as the genesis for this Article.187 
Hanesbrands terminated Mendenhall based on Hanesbrands’s contention 
that he violated the morals clause in his endorsement contract after he 
tweeted188 comments about the morality of celebrating Osama Bin Laden’s 
death. In 2008, Mendenhall entered into a three-year contract with 
Hanesbrands to endorse its products.189 Prior to the expiration of the original 
contract, both parties contractually agreed to extend the endorsement 
agreement for an additional four years but modified the agreement to include 
the following clause: 
If Mendenhall commits or is arrested for any crime or becomes 
involved in any situation or occurrence (collectively, the “Act”) 
tending to bring Mendenhall into public disrepute, contempt, 
scandal, or ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or offend the 
majority of the consuming public or any protected class or group 
thereof, then we shall have the right to immediately terminate this 
Agreement. HBI’s decision on all matters arising under this Section 
17(a) shall be conclusive.190 
Shortly after the contract extension, Mendenhall tweeted the following 
comments after President Barack Obama announced the death of Osama 
Bin Laden: 
What kind of person celebrates death? It’s amazing how people can 
HATE a man they never even heard speak. We’ve only heard one 
side . . . 191 
                                                                                                             
 187. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012). 
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I believe in God. I believe we’re ALL his children. And I believe 
HE is the ONE and ONLY judge.192  
Those who judge others, will also be judged themselves.193 
For those of you who said we want to see Bin Laden burn in hell 
and piss on his ashes, I ask how would God feel about your heart?194 
There is not an ignorant bone in my body. I just encourage you to 
#think195  
Mendenhall received both positive and negative responses to his tweets.196 
As a result of the negative responses, he issued the following explanation: 
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 193. @R_Mendenhall, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 3:26 PM), https://twitter.com 
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 194. @R_Mendenhall, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 3:28 PM), https://twitter.com 
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 195. @R_Mendenhall, TWITTER (May 2, 2011, 3:29 PM), https://twitter.com 
/R_Mendenhall/status/65181197537513473 [https://perma.cc/8ABY-DGAF]. 
 196. Complaint at 17–18, Rashard Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. 
Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (No. 11-Civ-570). According to Mendenhall’s 
complaint, he received several positive responses to his views, including: 
@R_Mendenhall At first I was upset about ur tweets but like ur goal it 
got me thinkin mad respect for u man Love a man of God 
@R_Mendenhall Forgiveness makes you a stronger and better person. 
holding [grudges] and not learning about the person him/herself will 
never get you anywhere 
@R_Mendenhall That’s the purpose of life to manifest ideas & create a 
better world for the future! #thinking leads to ideas, ideas = change!  
@R_Mendenhall I wish people would stop disagreeing with you and 
realize that by thinking, they are proving you right. You are so 
refreshing.  
@R_Mendenhall seriously says some of the most inspiring & truthful 
things I’ve heard in a while, he changed my opinion on athletes. i would 
give about anything just to have a conversation with @r_mendenhall. he 
speaks some of the realest words i’ve ever heard.  
@R_Mendenhall // appreciate your thought provoking tweets. it’s time 
people stop living a selfishly blind life.  
@R_Mendenhall you used to just be my favorite player on my favorite 
team, now you are just one of my favorite people. #inspiration  
@R_Mendenhall I’ve never been a Steelers fan, but I have more respect 
for you than any other professional athlete I can think of.  
@R_Mendenhall your mental state should be the prototype for not just 
athletes but humans in general. 
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I appreciate those of you who have decided to read this letter and 
attain a greater understanding of my recent twitter posts. I see how 
they have gotten misconstrued, and wanted to use this outlet as a 
way to clear up all things that do not truthfully represent myself, 
what I stand for personally, and any organization that I am a part 
of. First, I want people to understand that I am not in support of 
Bin Laden, or against the USA. I understand how devastating 9/11 
was to this country and to the people whose families were 
affected. Not just in the US, but families all over the world who 
had relatives in the World Trade Centers. My heart goes out to the 
troops who fight for our freedoms every day, not being certain if 
they will have the opportunity to return home, and the families 
who watch their loved ones bravely go off to war. Last year, I was 
grateful enough to have the opportunity to travel overseas and 
participate in a football camp put on for the children of US troops 
stationed in Germany. It was a special experience. These events 
have had a significant impact in my life. 
What kind of person celebrates death? It’s amazing how people 
can HATE a man they have never even heard speak. We’ve only 
heard one side . . .  
This controversial statement was something I said in response to 
the amount of joy I saw in the event of a murder. I don’t believe 
that this is an issue of politics or American pride; but one of 
religion, morality, and human ethics. In the bible, Ezekiel 33:11 
states, “Say to them, ‘As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign 
LORD, I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that 
they turn from their ways and live. Turn! Turn from your evil 
ways...” I wasn’t questioning Bin Laden’s evil acts. I believe that 
he will have to face God for what he has done. I was reflecting on 
our own hypocrisy. During 9/11 we watched in horror as parts of 
the world celebrated death on our soil. Earlier this week, parts of 
the world watched us in horror celebrating a man’s death. 
Nothing I said was meant to stir up controversy. It was my way to 
generate conversation. In looking at my timeline in its entirety, 
everything that I’ve said is with the intent of expressing a wide array 
of ideas and generating open and honest discussions, something I 
believe we as American citizens should be able to do. Most opinions 
will not be fully agreed upon and are not meant to be. However, I 
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believe every opinion should be respected or at least given some 
thought. I apologize for the timing as such a sensitive matter, but it 
was not meant to do harm. I apologize to anyone I unintentionally 
harmed with anything that I said, or any hurtful interpretation that 
was made and put in my name. It was only meant to encourage 
everyone reading it to think.197 
Thereafter, Hanesbrands terminated Mendenhall’s endorsement contract 
and issued this statement via ESPN: 
Champion is a strong supporter of the government’s efforts to fight 
terrorism and is very appreciative of the dedication and commitment 
of the U.S. Armed Forces. Earlier this week, Rashard Mendenhall, 
who endorses Champion products, expressed personal comments and 
opinions regarding Osama bin Laden and the September 11 terrorist 
attacks that were inconsistent with the values of the Champion brand 
and with which we strongly disagreed. In light of these comments, 
Champion was obligated to conduct a business assessment to 
determine whether Mr. Mendenhall could continue to effectively 
communicate on behalf of and represent Champion with consumers. 
While we respect Mr. Mendenhall’s right to express sincere thoughts 
regarding potentially controversial topics, we no longer believe that 
Mr. Mendenhall can appropriately represent Champion and we have 
notified Mr. Mendenhall that we are ending our business relationship. 
Champion has appreciated its association with Mr. Mendenhall 
during his early professional football career and found him to be a 
dedicated and conscientious young athlete. We sincerely wish him all 
the best.198 
Mendenhall sued Hanesbrands for breach of the endorsement contract, 
arguing that Hanesbrands’s termination (1) contravened the course of dealings 
between the parties because Hanesbrands was aware of Mendenhall’s use of 
Twitter to express his opinions on controversial subjects; (2) violated the 
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) was unreasonable 
because it was based on its mere disagreement with his comments and not 
because Mendenhall’s comments brought him into “public disrepute, 
contempt, scandal or ridicule, tending to shock, insult or offend the 
majority of the consuming public or any protected class or group 
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thereof.”199 In response, Hanesbrands filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings, arguing that the morals clause expressly granted Hanesbrands 
the right to terminate the contract.200 Although the court agreed that 
Hanesbrands possessed an express right to terminate the agreement, the 
court held that the company could not exercise that right arbitrarily, 
irrationally, or unreasonably.201 Hanesbrands also attempted to argue that 
Mendenhall’s admission in his complaint that he received negative 
comments was sufficient to justify his termination because these statements 
evidenced that his comments caused “public disrepute, contempt, scandal, 
or ridicule, or tend[ed] to shock, insult or offend the majority of the 
consuming public or any protected class or group thereof.”202 The court 
determined that a dispute of material fact existed on this issue because 
Mendenhall’s admission that he received negative comments was not an 
admission that his comments caused widespread objection but only that 
some people objected to his comments.203 In fact, Mendenhall’s complaint 
also provided evidence that some people viewed his comments positively.204 
Therefore, the court denied Hanesbrands’s motion because there was a dispute 
of material fact regarding the nature of the public’s response to Mendenhall’s 
comments.205 
Although this case seems to offer some support to athletes when 
challenging a corporation’s unilateral discretion to terminate an endorsement 
contract based on a morals clause, the court failed to render a decision that 
reflects the value of an athlete’s thought-provoking or political speech—
particularly when an athlete is a member of a marginalized population. 
Although the court in Mendenhall dismissed Hanesbrands’s motion to 
dismiss, Mendenhall nonetheless retained the burden of proof in establishing 
that Hanesbrands violated the implied obligation of fair dealing in good 
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faith.206 More accurately, the court did not determine that Hanesbrands 
violated the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing, only that 
Mendenhall pled sufficient facts to establish a dispute of material fact.207 
Ultimately, both parties settled for an undisclosed amount.208 Although some 
might view this case as a victory for athletes, such a conclusion is overly 
optimistic; had the case not settled, both parties presumably would have 
introduced evidence to establish the public’s opinion. In sifting through this 
evidence, the judge would have processed it by evaluating it through his own 
frame of reference. Although this approach seems reasonable, it has the 
potential to be biased substantially in favor of white judges’ conceptions of 
morality, which may not always coalesce with the moral conceptions of other 
groups.209 
V. DISCRETIONARY ENFORCEMENT  
Toni Lester’s article entitled “Finding the 'Public' in 'Public 
Disrepute” – Would the Cultural Defense Make a Difference in Celebrity 
and Sports Endorsement Contract Disputes? - The Case of Michael Vick 
and Adrian Peterson highlights a compelling issue about the discretion that 
courts and corporations are afforded in the evaluation of whether an athlete’s 
conduct is morally reprehensible.210 In his article, Lester evaluates the varying 
and often conflicting perspectives and attitudes that black and white Americans 
have regarding whether certain conduct is morally reprehensible.211 To 
facilitate his comparison, Lester evaluated the social attitudes of black and 
white Americans toward Michael Vick212 and Adrian Peterson213 after both 
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Orleans Saints of the NFL. In 2014, Peterson was indicted on charges of reckless or 
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were charged with engaging in criminal conduct.214 Vick was indicted and 
ultimately plead guilty to crimes involving dog abuse but Peterson was 
charged with child abuse and accepted a plea deal for a lesser charge of 
reckless assault after he “spanked” his son with a tree switch resulting in 
bruises to the boy’s body.215 In response to these criminal charges, Nike 
terminated both athletes’ endorsement contracts based on morals clauses 
contained in their agreements.216 
Professor Lester’s article highlights the critical point that morality is not 
absolute.217 Instead, conceptions of morality often are influenced by cultural 
and racial contexts.218 As evidence of this reality, Lester referenced an ESPN 
poll taken after Vick’s guilty plea that reflected that black people and white 
people had different perspectives about the media’s portrayal of black 
athletes.219 According to the results of the poll, 57% of black Americans 
believed that the media is biased against black athletes while only seven 
percent of white Americans held the same belief.220 In addition, the poll 
reflected that black people believe that “the media unfairly criticizes black 
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athletes more than white athletes, while the white fans suggest there is no 
difference in the media's handling of various cases.”221 The critical point 
here is that black fans were more likely to perceive the media’s attention 
towards black athletes as negative and biased while white fans were of the 
opinion that it was neutral and unbiased. Lester postulates that 
[s]ome of the frustration reflected in the poll may be grounded in 
the fact that there seems to be big cultural differences in how the 
conduct of Vick and Peterson is viewed. Some writers have argued 
that certain unique aspects of black culture - (dogfighting in the 
South, for instance, and strict child rearing mores) help explain 
(and potentially even justify) the behaviors of these men, the 
inference being that management and the courts should consider 
these differences before deciding their fate.222 
In evaluating the evidence relating to public opinion, Lester advances 
an interesting argument—that the court, in weighing such evidence, should 
consider the fact that the morality of certain conduct is measured relative to 
the cultural experiences of a particular cultural base.223 Failing to consider 
the concept of cultural relativism results in a form of racism. As a result, 
courts should value minority mores and culture in deciding morals clause 
disputes because this idea  
is in line with cultural relativism, which holds that one culture's 
practice and morals are equal to another's, even if they are different. 
Advocates of multiculturalism, cultural relativism's close cousin, 
also believe that “treating members of minority cultural groups as 
equals re-quires special accommodations to protect their contexts 
of choice.” In the criminal law arena, such an approach is called the 
“cultural defense.”224 
As Lester accurately points out, the likelihood that a court would accept the 
cultural defense in determining the enforceability of a morals clause is low.225 
Instead, Lester suggests that a court is more likely to attempt to determine how 
the public views the athlete’s conduct by evaluating “media coverage, public 
commentary, arrest records, and the views of management (usually in some 
combination with these other factors) to assess if public disrepute has occurred 
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in these forums.”226 The difficulty with this course of action is that this analysis 
largely will be influenced by the judge’s own perception of morality, and given 
that the majority of corporate decision makers, as well as the purchasing public, 
are white, these issues will be resolved to the detriment of athletes who come 
from diverse backgrounds.227 
Lester’s view about how to remedy the problem presented by discretionary 
review of morals clauses is a bit overly optimistic. Although he recognizes that 
a bias of some capacity exists regarding racial attitudes towards certain conduct, 
part of his suggestion for addressing this problem places the responsibility on 
companies to “do the right thing” by equally and fairly enforcing endorsement 
contracts.228 Although this is a reasonable assumption, this Article develops 
in more detail how this solution is unrealistic because the fundamental 
purpose of the corporate entity is profit maximization and because Corporate 
America, as well as some sectors of the judiciary, lacks meaningful diversity. 
A. Profit Maximization and Wealth Concentration 
The same companies that brought the United States to the brink of 
financial ruin229—motivated primarily by profit maximization and controlled 
largely by a homogenous group of white men—now have the power to 
determine morality in a way the government cannot. 
The primary purpose of the corporate entity is profit maximization.230 
Although the concept of “profit maximization” did not begin with the seminal 
case of Dodge v. Ford,231 this case is included in almost every corporate law 
textbook and is one of the foundational cases in support of this concept. In 
Dodge v. Ford, Henry Ford made two decisions: (1) to cut special dividends 
to Ford’s shareholders that included the Dodge Brothers; and (2) to retain cash 
in order to build a smelting plant for the purpose of increasing production.232 
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Generally, these types of business decisions fall within the province of the 
business judgment rule and are unlikely to be challenged successfully.233 
When Ford was questioned about why he cut the dividend, however, the basis 
of his testimony indicated that he thought the company had made too much 
profit and that profits should be invested back into the corporation so to 
increase the wages of employees and reduce the price of Ford’s cars to benefit 
the general public.234 Based on this testimony, the court declined to protect 
Ford’s decision and ordered that the corporation pay a special dividend.235 
Ford could have avoided this outcome by testifying that he cut the dividend 
to increase cash reserves for the future benefit of corporate expenditures. If 
so, the Dodge Brothers likely could not have challenged Ford’s decision 
successfully. In oft-quoted language, the court reasoned that 
[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised 
in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-
distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to 
other purposes.236 
Although there is some sentiment that Dodge v. Ford should be 
eliminated from the corporate law classroom,237 its fundamental principle 
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about profit maximization continues to be the primary validation for corporate 
existence. Therein lies the problem with assuming that corporations will 
police themselves adequately in fairly enforcing endorsement contracts. A 
corporation’s focus on profit maximization often conflicts with what most 
consider “morality.” As economist Milton Friedman remarked, “a corporation’s 
responsibility is to make as much money for the stockholders as possible.”238  
Because the primary objective of the corporation is to maximize profit, 
corporate decision making largely will operate to facilitate that purpose. This 
objective ensures that corporations will endeavor to satisfy and align their 
corporate perspective with those consumers that best support this end. This 
reality is especially troubling considering that the likelihood that black 
Americans’ concerns will align with corporate profitability is low given 
that the majority of wealth in the United States is concentrated in the hands 
of white people.239 Because white Americans possess the majority of 
wealth in the United States, white people’s purchasing power operates as 
a mechanism for subjugating black people’s issues and concerns for those 
of white consumers. Moreover, white American’s purchasing power 
forces Corporate America to appease white Americans’ interests. To 
appreciate the extent of white people’s purchasing power and influence, 
consider that white families own 90% of the United States’ wealth 
compared to black families who only hold 2.6%.240 As further context, 
black families account only for 2.6% of the United States’ wealth but make 
up approximately 13% of the overall population.241 Conversely, white 
families make up 90% of the United States’ wealth despite comprising 
only approximately 77% of the population.242 In fact, according to an 
article from Slate entitled “The Wealth Gap Between Blacks and Whites 
is Even More Enormous Than You Think[,]” 
the median white family has a net worth of $116,000 dollars. This 
indicates 41 million white households across the nation have over 
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$116,000 dollars in net worth. In comparison, nearly 40[%] or 5.6 
million African American homes in the U.S. have zero or negative 
net worth. In addition, when you deduct the family car as an asset, 
the median black family in America only has a net worth of $1,700 
dollars.243 
These facts highlight that wealth in the United States is concentrated in the 
hands of white Americans. Because wealth corresponds to purchasing 
power, corporations will be inclined to evaluate morality in a manner that 
most closely resembles the United States’ primary customer: white 
Americans. 
B. Lack of Corporate Diversity 
Another issue that largely influences corporate discretion is the fact 
that corporate decision makers overwhelmingly are white people. The lack 
of diversity in the United States’ corporate boardrooms and among its 
corporate officers is well-documented. 
In 2016, among the Fortune 100 corporations, white people accounted 
for 82.5% of board seats, whereas black people only accounted for 9.9% 
of board seats.244 Specifically, there were 1,205 total board seats among 
the Fortune 100, of which 994 were filled by white people—773 white 
men and 221 white women—compared to only 119 black people—90 
black men and 29 black women.245 
The board composition for Fortune 500 corporations in 2016 presents 
a more disparate result. Specifically, white people accounted for 85.6% of 
board seats whereas black people only accounted for 7.9% of board 
seats.246 Of the 5,440 total board seats among the Fortune 500, 4,656 were 
filled by white people—3,763 white males and 893 white women—
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compared to only 428 black people—306 black men and 122 black 
women.247 
In considering the relatively low number of black board members, it 
is important to keep another unsettling fact in mind: black board members 
are substantially more likely than white board members to sit on multiple 
boards.248 According to Richard Zweigenhaft, the Dana Professor of 
Psychology at Guilford College in Greensboro, North Carolina and author 
of several articles about the lack of diversity in the United States’ 
corporate boardrooms, one in three black board members sit on multiple 
boards compared to only one in six white board members doing the 
same.249 This statistic suggests that black board members are more likely 
to be recycled, which lessens the likelihood that new black board members 
will be selected for board positions to enhance diversity further in the 
United States’s corporate boardrooms. Thus, the overall statistics about 
black people’s representation on corporate boards are skewed because the 
minimal diversity that is present consistently is occupied by the same small 
number of black people. 
The number of black CEOs is even starker. As of January 2016, there 
were only five black CEOs among the Fortune 500, and there have been 
only 15 black CEOs in the entire history of the Fortune 500.250 According 
to Senator Bob Menedez’s 2014 Corporate Diversity Survey, diversity 
among corporate executive teams in the Fortune 100 also is lacking. 
Specifically, black people accounted for only 4.7% of these positions.251 
These statistics clearly highlight a lack of diversity and, more 
specifically, a lack of meaningful black representation within the United 
States’ corporate leadership. For those persons who are of the opinion that 
diversity does not influence corporate “morality” or corporate perspective, 
Ben & Jerry’s articulated position regarding the Black Lives Matter 
Movement provides proof positive that diversity does influence corporate 
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perspective. On the company’s main webpage, under the tab marked 
“Values,” it prominently displays the issues that Ben & Jerry’s cares about 
as a company. The first item listed is “Racial Justice.” In explaining why 
“Racial Justice” is important to Ben & Jerry’s, its explanation reaffirms 
one of the fundamental propositions of this Article: 
It is true that while we may have fewer overt racists, racism is still 
deeply embedded within systems like our schools, workplaces, the 
criminal justice system and hospitals, to name a few. Think about 
it: because white people occupy a disproportionate number of 
positions of power in our society it comes at the expense of people 
of color.252 
What is even more compelling about the company’s position is that it 
supports the Black Lives Matter Movement.253 
Black lives matter. 
They matter because they are children, brothers, sisters, mothers, 
and fathers. They matter because the injustices they face steal 
from all of us—white people and people of color alike. They steal 
our very humanity. Systemic and institutionalized racism are the 
defining civil rights and social justice issues of our time. We’ve 
come to understand that to be silent about the violence and threats 
to the lives and well-being of Black people is to be complicit in 
that violence and those threats. 
We ask you to join us in not being complicit. 
There is good news: the first step in overcoming systemic racism 
and injustice is to simply understand and admit that there is a 
problem. It’s trying to understand the perspective of others whose 
experiences are different from our own. To not just listen, but to 
truly understand those whose struggle for justice is real, and not 
yet complete. 
Rev. Dr. William J. Barber, II, President of the North Carolina 
NAACP, said it best when reacting to the recent police shooting 
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in Charlotte, NC. He said, “Our objective is simple: to ensure 
justice-loving people act toward justice, with all evidence, and that 
we stand together and act from a place of power and love, rather 
than out of fear and anger.” 
It’s been hard to watch the list of unarmed Black Americans killed 
by law enforcement officers grow longer and longer. We 
understand that numerous Black Americans and white Americans 
have profoundly different experiences and outcomes with law 
enforcement and the criminal justice system. That’s why it’s 
become clear to us at Ben & Jerry’s that we have a moral 
obligation to take a stand now for justice and for Black lives. 
We want to be clear: we believe that saying Black lives matter is 
not to say that the lives of those who serve in the law enforcement 
community don’t. We respect and value the commitment to our 
communities that those in law enforcement make, and we respect 
the value of every one of their lives. 
But we do believe that — whether Black, brown, white, or blue 
— our nation and our very way of life is dependent on the 
principle of all people being served equal justice under the law. 
And it’s clear, the effects of the criminal justice system are not 
color blind. 
We do not place the blame for this on individual officers. Rather, 
we believe it is due to the systemic racism built into the fabric of 
our institutions at every level, disadvantaging and discriminating 
against people of color in ways that go beyond individual intent to 
discriminate. For this reason, we are not pointing fingers at 
individuals; we are instead urging us to come together to better our 
society and institutions so that we may finally fulfill the founding 
promise of this country: to be a country with dignity and justice for 
all. 
All lives do matter. But all lives will not matter until Black lives 
matter. 
We ask people to be open to understanding these issues, and not to 
reflexively retreat to our current beliefs. Change happens when 
people are willing to listen and hear the struggles of their neighbor, 
putting aside preconceived notions and truly seeking to understand 
and grow. We’ll be working hard on that, and ask you to as well. 
- Your friends at Ben & Jerry’s254 
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Ben & Jerry’s position on racial justice is an anomaly in the corporate 
world. Although many corporations that embrace conceptions of corporate 
social responsibility focus on things like environmental issues, Ben & Jerry’s 
cut against the grain by focusing on race.255 The company’s racial focus likely 
is attributable to the meaningful representation of diversity on its board as well 
as the fact that is original founders were socially conscious individuals who 
worked to ingrain conceptions of social justice within the organizational 
fabric of their business.256 The company’s ten-person board contains four 
women—including one black and one Indian female—and one black male.257 
Although the board also includes five white males, it has a meaningful 
population of minorities, which substantially reduces the tokenism effect.258 
Contrast the racially diverse board that Ben & Jerry’s has with AIG’s 
board in 2003 prior to the financial crisis.259 In 2003, AIG’s board of 15 
members lacked any meaningful diversity. Based on AIG’s Board of 
Director’s picture from 2003, its board consisted of 14 white people—12 
white males and two white females—and one male of Asian descent.260 
Needless to say, this lack of diversity may have been one of the primary 
reasons for AIG’s failure. One of the practices that allowed AIG to profit in 
the manner that it did during the market boom was its focus on discriminatory 
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lending practices wherein AIG would charge black borrowers greater broker 
fees than white borrowers.261 As a result, the United States Department of 
Justice and the United States Attorney General’s Office sued AIG and 
successfully negotiated a consent decree within which the company agreed to 
1. Refrain from engaging in any act or practice in wholesale home 
mortgage lending that discriminates on the basis of race or color; 
2. Maintain during the period of the order annual fair lending training; 
3. Develop and implement specific, nonracial standards for the 
assessment of direct broker fees on residential real estate-related 
loans; 
4. Post and prominently display in each location where loan 
applications are received by the lender a notice of nondiscrimination; 
5. Require brokers to make certain disclosures to applicants; 
6. Participate in a monitoring program to ensure compliance with the 
provisions of the consent decree; 
7. Provide a minimum of $1 million to certain organizations to 
provide credit counseling, financial literacy, and other related 
educational programs to African-American borrowers; 
8. Provide employees with equal credit opportunity training; and 
9. Pay $6.1 million in damages to those affected by AIG's 
discriminatory lending practices.262 
In comparing the diversity on Ben & Jerry’s board to that of AIG’s 
during the financial crisis, one could extrapolate that greater levels of 
diversity lead to more racially, and possibly socially, conscious decisions. 
Based on this idea, one reasonably could assume that a more meaningful 
representation of black board members on AIG’s board possibly could 
have curbed its discriminatory lending practices towards black borrowers. 
In fact, some scholars opine that the entire financial crisis could have been 
prevented if more women were represented on the boards of the companies 
that contributed to the crisis, based on the idea that women tend to be more 
risk averse than men.263 
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Again, if the population consists predominately of white people, the 
purchasing power of white people far exceeds the purchasing power of black 
people. If the corporate management structure consists overwhelmingly of 
white people, then it will be extremely difficult for black people’s conceptions 
of morality to prevail when they conflict with that of the dominant group. If 
white people and black people view the world from different vantage points 
and have different perspectives about morality regarding these types of issues, 
then it likely would have been difficult for Mendenhall and other athletes from 
diverse backgrounds to validate a different perspective of morality. In addition 
to the lack of diversity in the areas highlighted above, there is also a lack of 
diversity within the judiciary. 
C. Lack of Judicial Diversity 
According to statistics from the Federal Judicial Center, white people 
overwhelmingly make up the federal judiciary.264 
 
Federal “Sitting Judges” as of April 21, 2017 
 Total # of 
Judges 
Total % of 
Judges 
Total # of “Sitting Judges” 1318 100% 
Female 351 27% 
Male 967 73% 
   
Total # of White “Sitting Judges” 1047 79% 
Female 258 20% 
Male 789 60% 
   
Total # of Black “Sitting Judges” 148 11% 
Female 53 4% 
Male 95 7% 
 
The representation of black judges at the state level is just as abysmal, 
especially among judges at the highest state court level.265 
 
State Judges by Race (Numbers) 
Court White 
African 
American 
Hispanic 
Asian 
American 
Native 
American 
Other Total 
Supreme Court 307 20 8 5 0 0 340 
Intermediate 
App. Courts 
856 60 25 13 2 2 958 
Trial Courts 9037 585 287 104 11 22 10046 
Total 10200 665 320 122 13 24 11344 
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All Judges by Race 
 State Judges Federal Judges Total 
White 10200 652 10852 
African American 665 89 754 
Hispanic 320 58 378 
Asian American 122 6 128 
Native American 13 0 13 
Other  24 0 24 
Total 11344 805 12149 
 
These statistics highlight that meaningful diversity is absent at each level of 
the judiciary. This lack of diversity is critically important because judges 
influence the scope and course of the litigation process. Implicit in this lack 
of diversity is an inherent bias that can cause a judge’s race to influence 
judicial outcomes. In fact, there is substantial research to suggest that 
judicial bias profoundly impacts litigation outcomes.266 For example, 
research indicates that race influences the likelihood that a judge’s decision 
will be overturned,267 the likelihood that a judge will side with a litigant,268 
and whether a claimant in a discrimination case will prevail.269 Given the 
results of these studies, it is clear that the racial composition of the judiciary 
legitimately can influence the outcome of litigation. Similar to the lack of 
diversity among corporate decision makers, this problem skews the way that 
judges evaluate morality. More specifically, in recognizing that black people 
and white people share different perspectives regarding morality, it is not 
beyond the realm of possibility that moral differences will influence the way 
that certain behavior is perceived. To offset this reality, it is imperative that 
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the way in which morals clauses are interpreted, in relation to certain 
expressions, must be modified to minimize this bias. 
VI. THE SOLUTION 
Because of the concerns highlighted above, courts need to rethink the 
way in which they evaluate the enforceability of morals clauses. As the 
law presently operates, a plaintiff claiming that a corporation abused its 
discretion in terminating an endorsement contract pursuant to a morals 
clause would carry the burden of establishing that either the termination 
was not made in good faith270 or that the termination violated an 
established public policy.271 Instead of using this framework, a fairer and 
more balanced approach would place the initial burden on the plaintiff-
endorser to establish that his speech is protected speech. To establish that 
his speech is protected, the plaintiff would need to establish that it falls 
into a category of speech that otherwise would be protected if it was 
spoken by a governmental employee. This initial burden strikes a fairer 
balance because it recognizes the value in prohibiting non-diverse, profit-
driven entities from unreasonably trammeling free speech rights, 
especially when it relates to marginalized populations that otherwise do 
not have a meaningful voice in effectuating change. Moreover, the 
relationship between athletes and corporations is analogous to the 
relationship between the government and its employees because the 
government clearly has an interest in limiting certain employee speech 
rights in order to maintain an effective and efficient perception of its 
structure and viability, similar to the way that a corporation has a vested 
interest in protecting is brand and goodwill. The free speech rights of 
government employees more closely approximates the appropriate speech 
right protections of athletes in determining the enforceability of morals 
clauses because these rights recognize that government employees, like 
athletes, should not always have an unfettered right to speak, considering 
that there are important interests to be protected by both the government 
and private corporations. 
Next, if the plaintiff-endorser establishes that his speech is protected, 
the burden will shift to the corporation to rebut this presumption by 
proving that the plaintiff endorser’s speech is in direct contravention to the 
purpose of the endorsement contract, that the plaintiff-endorser’s expression 
has a direct and negative effect on the corporation’s goodwill or brand image, 
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or that the contract includes a clause narrowly tailored to prohibit the very 
speech expressed by the plaintiff-endorser. 
In thinking about the first type of affirmative defense, in which the speech 
is in direct contravention to the purpose of the endorsement contract, consider 
a corporation that specializes in selling luxury handbags and other leather 
accessories. If that company contracts with an athlete to endorse its products, 
it would be inconsistent with the nature of the agreement to allow an athlete 
to condemn the slaughter of animals for their pelts or to support the People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”). 
In regards to the second category, the morally reprehensible conduct of 
Lance Armstrong, a seven-time winner of the Tour de France, and Ray Rice, 
a former NFL running back with the Baltimore Ravens, provides two 
excellent examples of the type of conduct that could have a direct and negative 
effect on the corporation’s goodwill. In Armstrong’s case, Nike, Trek, and 
Oakley terminated their endorsement deals with him, pursuant to contract-
based morals clauses, after the United States Anti-Doping Agency stripped 
him of all of his Tour de France titles and issued a life-time cycling ban after 
it determined that Armstrong, along with his fellow team members, used 
performance enhancing drugs (“PEDs”).272 Rice also lost several endorsement 
deals, including one with Nike, pursuant to a contract-based morals clause 
after a video was released showing him brutally beating his wife in a hotel 
elevator.273 
Finally, the third way that a corporation could establish an affirmative 
defense is by proving that the morals clause was tailored narrowly to prohibit 
the specific speech expressed by the plaintiff. For example, ABC has adopted 
Twitter guidelines prohibiting specific “tweet” practices.274 Although there is 
no evidence that any of these guidelines are incorporated into any of the ABC 
employee contracts, the guidelines themselves provide an example of 
contractual language that could be used by a corporation to allow it specifically 
to terminate a contract for narrowly defined conduct. Although this example 
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falls outside the scope of the athlete endorsement context, it nonetheless 
provides useful illustration of the facts necessary to prove this defense. 
Significantly, the test advanced by this Article has some support in 
existing case law. The court in Davies v. Grossmont Union High School 
District applied a similar burden-shifting framework in determining that a 
party could not waive a constitutional right contractually if the waiver 
significantly impacted the public at large, even if the party waiving the right 
received valid consideration and made the decision knowingly.275 In Davies, 
two employees, Dr. Thomas Davies and Ms. Davies, sued their employer, 
Grossmont High School District (“the District”), for violations under federal 
and state law after Ms. Davies was transferred to less desirable 
employment.276 After the suit was filed, the Davies reached a settlement 
agreement with the District to settle the case in exchange for cash 
consideration.277 The agreement also provided that “‘neither one nor both of 
[the Davieses] will ever seek, apply for, or accept future employment, 
position, or office with Defendant District in any capacity.’”278 A year later, 
however, Dr. Davies campaigned and was elected to the Governing Board of 
the District.279 Thereafter, the District brought a motion to enforce the 
settlement agreement.280 The district court ruled in the District’s favor and 
ordered Dr. Davies to resign from his position.281 On appeal, Dr. Davies 
argued that the settlement agreement should not bar his election for the 
following reasons: (1) the terms of the settlement agreement did not apply 
to the elective office;282 (2) “he did not knowingly intend to waive his 
constitutional right to run for office”;283 and (3) the District waived its right 
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to enforce the settlement agreement because it was aware that he was 
running for the position but waited until he was elected to assert breach of 
the settlement agreement.284 The court dismissed the first two arguments and 
did not decide the third because of insufficient factual inquiry.285 Dr. Davies, 
however, made one additional argument, and the court of appeals found it 
persuasive. Dr. Davies argued that the agreement violated public policy 
because it violated his constitutional right to run for elective office and the 
constitutional right of the voters to elect him.286 In deciding this issue in Dr. 
Davies’s favor, the court applied the Rumery balancing test.287 Pursuant to 
this test, the inquiry focuses on whether the public interest in enforcement 
of the agreement or provision is outweighed by the policy furthered by non-
enforcement of the agreement.288 In applying this test, “when there is a 
substantial public interest that would be harmed by enforcement,” the party 
seeking enforcement of the agreement must prove some important interest 
beyond its own interest in enforcement of the agreement.289 The court 
concluded that the District did not meet this burden because the public 
policy in favor of non-enforcement of the agreement was more compelling 
than the arguments offered by the District in favor of its enforcement.290 
The trial court rejected both of the District’s arguments in support of the 
agreement’s enforcement.291 First, the District argued that there is a strong 
policy in favor of enforcing private settlement agreements.292 Although the 
court recognized this argument, it did not find it compelling because this 
policy was outweighed by the constitutional right that the agreement 
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infringed.293 Second, the District argued that the voters were in a better 
situation if Dr. Davies were not included in the election because he is a 
“troublesome person.”294 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that 
“the people are the best judges of their own interests, and that in the long 
run it is better to permit them to make their own mistakes than to permit 
their ‘rulers’ to make all their decisions for them.”295 Additionally, the court 
noted that the right of the people to elect representatives of their own 
choosing “is inextricably intertwined with the public's fundamental right to 
vote, and may be limited only where necessary to achieve a compelling state 
purpose.”296 
This case illustrates the central argument advanced by this Article—the 
burden of determining the enforceability of a morals clause, attempting to 
stifle certain speech, should rest with the corporation. 
Moreover, the public concerns highlighted in Davies are more compelling 
in cases involving the enforcement of morals clauses, particularly when they 
relate to racially diverse athletes speaking on issues related to or important to 
members of marginalized populations. Racially diverse athletes have 
increased levels of importance to the communities they represent because 
these communities often lack the financial and political resources to have a 
legitimate voice.297  
What corporations likely want is for black athletes to mimic Michael 
Jordan’s approach to issues of social justice because Jordan’s approach 
maintained the status quo.298 Jordan’s off-the-court personality was focused 
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ma.cc/MW6Q-M2Z6]. 
I think the pressures that he was feeling from corporate entities provided a 
lot of his impoliticness. So it was sculpted more to capitalize on the brand, 
capitalize on those brands he represented, more so than to capitalize on 
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primarily on his brand image to the exclusion of addressing issues pertinent 
to the black community.299 Although Jordan represented the apex of sports 
success, he 
has never shown much interest in shaping the world that lies at his feet. 
He carefully dodged any political issue that might have jeopardized his 
family-friendly image. When asked in 1992 about the Rodney King 
riots in Los Angeles, for instance, Jordan lamely replied: “I need to 
know more about it.” He refused to take a side in the tight 1990 North 
Carolina Senate race in which Jesse Helms, despised by many blacks, 
was challenged by a black man, Harvey Gantt. Approached by Gantt’s 
campaign, Jordan declined to get involved, reportedly offering this 
explanation: “Republicans buy sneakers, too.”300 
Corporations desire that black athletes toe the company line and refrain 
from speaking on issues that make white Americans uncomfortable.301 This 
concern does not impact white athletes in the same manner because, as noted 
above, black people and white people view issues of morality and social 
acceptability differently.302 Additionally, because white people disproportionally 
                                                                                                             
what he could do as far as job creation and taking away some of the 
violence and the violent mindset. We could've played a larger role in the 
images that were given about Chicago during that period of time and years 
that followed. 
 Id. 
 299. Jordan “has never used his platform to pursue social or political change; 
indeed, he’s gone out of his way to play it safe. This is, of course, precisely how the 
corporations he endorses want it. Politics and successful marketing don’t mix.” 
Michael Crowley, Muhammad Ali Was a Rebel. Michael Jordan Is a Brand Name, 
NIEMAN REPS. (Fall 1999), http://niemanreports.org/articles/muhammad-ali-was-a-
rebel-michael-jordan-is-a-brand-name/ [https://perma.cc/S5RL-LY3H]. 
 300. Id. 
 301. See Michael McCarthy, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Will sports TV viewers and 
sponsors be turned off by activist athletes?, SPORTING NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/nba/news/eli-manning-lebron-james-eric-garner-mich 
ael-brown-nfl-nba-activist-athletes-new-york-giants-cleveland-cavaliers-georgetown 
-hoyas/1iu8uywczsuei1l8vyyjgoi3u5 (“Sponsors get ‘nervous’ when athletes mix 
politics and sports, warned Brandon Steiner, CEO of Steiner Sports.”) [https://per 
ma.cc/99CX-QLVX]. 
 302. The NBA’s most recent memorandum reminding its players that they 
must stand during the National Anthem highlights this issue, especially 
considering that black athletes and white athletes have drastically different views 
on this issue. Denis Slattery, NBA memo warns teams to stand during national 
anthem ‘OR ELSE’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 30, 2017), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/sports/basketball/nba-memo-reminds-teams-stand-national-anthem- 
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occupy the corporate management structure, the judiciary, the political power 
structure, and contain the majority of the wealth in the United States, their 
views are well represented. For example, after several black athletes, 
including Lebron James and Derrick Rose, began wearing “I can’t breathe” 
t-shirts303 to protest police brutality against black people after Eric Garner was 
choked to death by a New York police officer, there was substantial 
discussion about whether any professional sports league or corporation would 
take an adverse action against the protestors.304 First, for the reasons 
highlighted in Part V, it is extremely troubling that a professional sports 
league or a corporation could execute a tangible action against an athlete 
to attempt to stifle such critical expression. Second, the primary opposition 
against the black athletes who supported the protest came from white players, 
owners, and fans. For example, Eli Manning, a white quarterback for the New 
York Giants, openly questioned whether athletes should use the game 
experience to protest violence against black people.305 Specifically, he 
remarked that “[o]bviously, when we’re on the field, we’re wearing our 
uniforms. You know there’s a time and place to make your statements. I don’t 
know if it’s always during a game.”306 Manning’s position reflects his status 
as a white male and the privilege that he experiences through the color of his 
skin. For him, there exists a time and place to express racial injustice; 
however, for the black players that experience racial injustice more directly, 
the time, need, and importance of addressing it are more critical. Because 
white people do not experience the evils of over-policing to the same extent 
as black people, it is obvious why Manning would make such a comment—
he is not affected by it, nor are his family members likely to become victims 
of it.307 According to a research study conducted by Cody T. Ross at the 
                                                                                                             
article-1.3532858 [https://perma.cc/BN2M-SL22]. According to a CNN poll, 59% 
of white people said that kneeling during the National Anthem is wrong, whereas 
82% of black people said that it's the right thing to do. See Agiesta, supra note 7. 
 303. The shirts represent the words spoken by Mr. Garner as he was choked to 
death. See Scott Cacciola, LeBron James, Jay-Z and More Made ‘I Can't Breathe’ T-
Shirts Happen in the N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2014/12/10/sports/basketball/i-cant-breathe-tshirts-in-the-nba-how-jayz-lebron- 
james-and-others-made-them-happen.html [https://perma.cc/632Z-RMM3]. 
 304. See McCarthy, supra note 301; see also Shaun Powell, Reinvigorated 
spirit of protest ignites throughout the NBA, NBA (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:01 AM), 
http://www.nba.com/2014/news/features/shaun_powell/12/11/nba-shirt-protests-
i-cant-breathe/ (discussing whether the NBA’s commissioner might discipline 
players for wearing the “I Can’t Breathe” t-shirts) [https://perma.cc/UZ6T-9PN3]. 
 305. McCarthy, supra note 301.  
 306. Id.  
 307. Kia Makarechi, What the Data Really Says About Police and Racial Bias, 
VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2016, 3:09 PM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016 
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University of California, Davis, there is a “significant bias in the killing of 
unarmed black Americans relative to unarmed white Americans, in that the 
probability of being black, unarmed, and shot by police is about 3.49 times 
the probability of being white, unarmed, and shot by police on average.”308 
Jim Brown, NFL legend and social activist, is encouraged by the 
willingness of modern athletes like Dwyane Wade, Lebron James, and 
Carmelo Anthony to speak out against issues of injustice affecting the black 
community. Brown remarked, 
I love it. We’ve been asking athletes for a long time, especially this 
generation, to stand for something. A lot of them, to me, have been 
cowards. And unwilling to do it. Now they are. And I think that’s 
great. Even if you disagree with it, let them talk, let them express 
themselves. They're not robots.309 
When black athletes pull a “Jordan,” their lack of engagement reinforces 
the status quo that confirms the majority perspective. The modern-day morals 
clause enables corporations to “Jordanize” black athletes by preventing them 
from expressing views that are inconsistent with the views of white 
Americans. More importantly, these clauses can be used to encourage 
athletes, particularly black athletes, to disconnect themselves from their 
communities in favor of profit. 
The test advanced by this Article does not undermine the scope and 
validity of the morals clause. More accurately, it limits the application of these 
provisions when they attempt to restrict “protected” speech unreasonably. 
This Article’s approach will continue to give corporations the power to 
terminate endorsement deals for a wide array of inappropriate conduct, 
                                                                                                             
/07/data-police-racial-bias (referencing 18 separate research studies that provide 
evidence that a person’s race influences the nature of his or her police encounter) 
[https://perma.cc/N3AE-5QVN]. 
 308. Cody T. Ross, A Multi-Level Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police 
Shootings at the County-Level in the United States, 2011-2014, PLOS ONE (Nov. 
5, 2015), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pone 
.0141854 [https://perma.cc/HG6M-285P]. 
 309. McCarthy, supra note 301. 
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including, but not limited to, hate speech,310 tortious and/or criminal 
misconduct,311 infidelity,312 or product criticism. 
A critical component of this test requires a determination of the type of 
speech that should and should not be protected. Initially, this may seem like a 
difficult task; there is a plethora of case law in the First Amendment context, 
however, that provides a useful basis for making this determination. Because 
of this existing case law, the approach for interpreting morals clauses 
articulated in this Article can be applied easily without developing a new legal 
analysis or framework. 
VII. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Despite First Amendment protections being inapplicable to an 
athlete’s right to express himself freely, First Amendment jurisprudence 
can be a viable tool to assist courts in determining what types of expression 
a corporation may prohibit lawfully without violating public policy or 
running afoul of the implied obligation of good faith.313 The position 
                                                                                                             
 310. For example, under the approach advanced by this Article, Nike was well 
within its contractual rights to cancel Manny Pacquaio’s endorsement deal after he 
made the following comments to a Filipino television station: “Have you seen any 
animal having male-to-male or female-to-female relations? If you have male-to-
male or female-to-female [relationships], then people are worse than animals.” 
Cindy Boren, Manny Pacquiao apologizes for saying gay people are ‘worse than 
animals’, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2016/02/16/manny-pacquiao-apologizes-for-saying-gay-people-are-worse- 
than-animals/?utm_term=.12e213d06eb6 [https://perma.cc/9JF3-E5SX]. 
 311. Although he had yet to be convicted, the test advanced by this article 
would validate Cytosport’s termination of Aaron Hernandez’s endorsement deal 
after an investigation was launched into his role in Odin Lloyd’s murder. See Josh 
Katzowitz, Report: Aaron Hernandez loses endorsement deal, CBS SPORTS (June 
21, 2013), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/report-aaron-hernandez-loses-
endorsement-deal/ [https://perma.cc/C2C6-2NGP]. 
 312. Tiger Woods’s infidelity would provide a valid basis to terminate an 
endorsement deal. After admitting that he had engaged in infidelity, Woods lost 
endorsement deals with AT&T, Accenture, and Gatorade. Interestingly, it is not 
entirely clear that these companies terminated him for violating a morals clause or 
whether his endorsement contracts were not renewed when the original contract 
expired. Gatorade cuts ties with Tiger Woods; third major sponsor to drop him, 
N.Y. POST (Feb. 26, 2010), http://nypost.com/2010/02/26/gatorade-cuts-ties-with-
tiger-woods-third-major-sponsor-to-drop-him/ [https://perma.cc/X2EE-L7ZZ]. 
 313. Because private corporations are not state actors, First Amendment free 
speech rights do not attach. See Jeannette Cox, A Chill Around the Water Cooler: 
First Amendment in the Workplace, 15 INSIGHTS ON L. & SOC’Y 12 (2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_andsociety/15/winter 
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advanced by this Article is that the implied obligation of good faith and/or 
the public policy exception should operate to prohibit a corporation from 
terminating an athlete’s contract when the athlete engages in content or 
viewpoint-based speech that otherwise would be protected by the First 
Amendment. The basis for this position is that athletes play a critical role 
in bringing issues of injustice to the forefront of the social conscience. 
Although a particular athlete’s position may not coalesce with the 
management of the corporation, an athlete’s position nonetheless may 
provide useful insight to the public. This notion is particularly true regarding 
marginalized populations, such as the black community, in which athletes 
have an increased level of importance in light of the lack of traditional 
opportunities in these communities. There may be circumstances in which 
an athlete’s speech may be deemed morally reprehensible to corporate 
decision makers and the public, yet the same speech is viewed positively 
among members of the marginalized group. As a result, this Article 
advances a novel idea that provides for the protection of specific content and 
viewpoint-based speech in the scenario in which it would be protected if 
spoken by a governmental employee. To understand adequately what type 
of speech should limit a corporation’s right to terminate an athlete’s 
contract, it is necessary to provide a brief discussion regarding the contours 
of First Amendment speech. The purpose of this Article, however, is not 
to provide a robust commentary regarding the First Amendment and free 
speech rights; instead, this Article’s objective is merely to highlight how 
a court may use the existing First Amendment jurisprudence to determine 
what type of speech should be protected. 
In analyzing whether speech is protected under the First Amendment, 
there are three general classes of speech: (1) speech for which there is no 
protection; (2) speech for which there is limited protection; and (3) protected 
speech.314 The first class, unprotected speech, includes “obscenity, child 
pornography,” or speech that constitutes “‘advocacy of the use of force or of 
law violation’” in which “‘such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.’”315 Each category of speech listed in the first class are types of 
speech for which there is no inherent social value. As the Court noted in 
Roth v. United States, “All ideas having even the slightest redeeming 
                                                                                                             
-2015/chill-around-the-water-cooler.html (briefly explaining that employees have 
very limited rights to express themselves freely in the private workplace) [https: 
//perma.cc/7F8D-GLMM].  
 314. KATHLEEN ANNE RUANE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-815, FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FFE-AFGF].  
 315. Id. at 5. 
2017] AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION 61 
 
 
 
social importance[—]unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas 
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion[—]have the full protection of 
the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited 
area of more important interests.”316 Additionally, several of the types of 
speech listed in this category have another compelling motivation for their 
lack of First Amendment protection. In regard to child pornography317 and 
fighting words,318 each of these categories of speech causes harm to 
another person other than the speaker. 
Speech for which there is only limited protection includes 
“commercial speech, defamation (libel and slander), speech that may be 
harmful to children, speech broadcast on radio and television (as opposed 
to speech transmitted via cable or the Internet), and public employees’ 
speech.”319 
The final category of speech, more generally, includes speech that 
does not fall into the two prior categories. This type of speech receives the 
greatest level of First Amendment protection. Nonetheless, this type of 
speech can be limited in regards to its content when the government can 
                                                                                                             
 316. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 317. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–64 (1982) (holding that First 
Amendment does not protect child pornography for five reasons: 
(1) It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in 
“safeguarding the physical and psychological wellbeing of a minor” is 
“compelling.” 
(2) The distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity 
by juveniles is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children . . . . 
(3) Advertising and selling child pornography provides an economic 
motive for engaging in an illegal activity. 
(4) The literary and/or artistic value of permitting live performances and 
photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct 
is de minimis since these things could be accomplished using persons 
over the statutory age. 
(5) Finally, the evils of child pornography outweigh its expressive 
interests.). 
 318. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Chaplinsky 
was convicted of a New Hampshire statute prohibiting the use of offensive or 
annoying words when addressing another person in public after he called a city 
marshal a “God Damned racketeer” and “a damned fascist.” Id. at 569. Chaplinsky 
appealed the conviction claiming that the statute placed an unreasonable restraint 
on free speech. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the statute did not 
place an unreasonable restraint on trade because Chaplinsky’s comments were 
likely to provoke the average person to retaliate resulting in a breach of peace. Id. 
at 574. 
 319. RUANE, supra note 314, at 1.  
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establish that its regulation is designed to serve a compelling state interest 
and that it is drawn narrowly to serve that purpose.320 The government also 
can regulate content-neutral speech in regards to its time, place, and 
manner if the regulation is tailored narrowly to serve a significant 
government interest and leaves open ample alternative channels of 
communication.321 
In thinking about how First Amendment jurisprudence can assist in 
helping to understand what speech a corporation lawfully can regulate, 
pursuant to the test advanced herein, consider the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Pickering v. Board of Education322 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.323 Both of 
these cases involved circumstances in which a government employer took 
adverse action against a government employee after the employee engaged in 
speech criticizing the employer.324 These cases provide an excellent parallel 
for explaining how First Amendment cases can help in determining the 
enforceability of speech prohibited by a morals clause. Free Speech Rights 
largely are determined by the status of the speaker and the subject matter of 
the speaker’s expression. Private citizens, speaking on matters of public 
concern, receive the greatest level of First Amendment protection.325 
Government employees, speaking on matters of public concern, also receive 
a fairly high level of protection.326 In contrast, government employees 
                                                                                                             
 320. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  
 323. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  
 324. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564; Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 413–15. 
 325. Private employers, however, generally are granted more leeway to take 
adverse actions against private employees for expressions inconsistent with the 
employer’s objectives. According to “Lafe E. Solomon, acting general counsel for 
the National Labor Relations Board, however, the National Labor Relations Act 
protects some employee social-media activity and as a result, private employees 
now have more freedom of speech than their government counterparts.” Douglass 
E. Lee, NLRB bolsters private-employee speech, FIRST AMENDMENT CNTR. (Sept. 
14, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/nlrb-bolsters-private-employee-
speech [https://perma.cc/LQR9-WQ5B]. The NLRB protects most private sector 
employees and allows them to “form or join unions; engage in protected, 
concerted activities to address or improve working conditions; or refrain from 
engaging in these activities.” What are my rights under the National Labor 
Relations Act?, Frequently Asked Questions – NLRB, NLRB, https://www 
.nlrb.gov/resources/faq/nlrb#t38n3180 (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) [https://per 
ma.cc/78DH-GPWL]; see also Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. 
L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). Thus, employees who engage in these activities 
via social media are protected by the NLRB and cannot be adversely disciplined. 
 326. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–71. 
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speaking on employment related matters have the least First Amendment 
protection, especially when the employee’s speech interferes with his 
ability to perform the job.327 These employees have the least First 
Amendment protection because the government, in this context, has a 
strong interest in regulating this type of speech because it has the capacity 
to interrupt the government’s ability to service its customers—the 
public.328 Given that corporations also have a significant interest in 
servicing their customers, by analogy, this category of speech provides the 
most reasonable basis for determining when an endorser’s speech should 
be protected and therefore not subject to termination via a broadly drafted 
morals clause. 
In Pickering, school teacher Marvin Pickering was terminated after he 
wrote a letter to the local newspaper criticizing his employer, the Will 
County School Board in Illinois (“Board”) and the superintendent.329 
Pickering’s letter criticized: (1) the manner in which the Board handled 
two bond issues to raise money for the school district; (2) the way the 
school stated that funds from the bond issue would be used for 
academic/educational purposes, yet were used disproportionately for 
athletic endeavors; and (3) the superintendent and Board for attempting to 
prevent teachers from the district from criticizing the Board.330 The United 
States Supreme Court held that Pickering’s termination violated his First 
Amendment rights.331 The Court reasoned that the statements were general 
statements not directed toward anyone with whom Pickering would 
interact and therefore there was no real evidence that his statements would 
interrupt his daily position.332 As such, because neither the Board nor the 
Superintendent served as Pickering’s immediate supervisor, the Court 
opined that their workplace relationship was too attenuated to hold that 
“personal loyalty and confidence” were necessary for an efficient 
workplace interaction.333 In essence, the Court opined that the employee’s 
speech was not within the scope of his employment and, as a result, his 
speech was more like that of a private citizen.334 Although the Court 
concluded that Pickering’s letter contained false accusations about the 
Board’s allocation of funds, the Court held that such misstatements were 
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 334. See id. at 574–75.  
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not sufficient to justify his termination.335 Specifically, there was no proof 
that Pickering made the statements knowingly or recklessly, and, 
therefore, his First Amendment right to freedom of speech trumped the 
Board’s desire to terminate.336 Moreover, there was no real evidence that 
Pickering’s statements harmed the school district because his statements 
were made after the bonds were awarded already and the board’s true 
allocation of funds was a matter of public record that clarified that the 
funds were not spent improperly as Pickering claimed.337 
In Garcetti, Ceballos, a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles 
District Attorney’s Office, sent an inter-office memorandum complaining 
about an affidavit that was used to obtain a search warrant.338 Specifically, 
a local defense attorney contacted Ceballos and informed him about several 
inaccuracies contained in the affidavit.339 Ceballos investigated the assertions 
made in the affidavit and determined that it did in fact contain serious 
misrepresentations.340 Ceballos then called the warrant affiant, a deputy 
sheriff in the local sheriff’s department, to discuss the misrepresentations, but 
Ceballos was not happy with the deputy’s response.341 Thereafter, Ceballos 
communicated his findings to his supervisors and subsequently drafted a 
memorandum reiterating his concerns and recommending dismissal of the 
case.342 His supervisors disagreed and thereafter Ceballos alleged that he was 
subjected to a series of retaliatory employment actions that included 
“reassignment from his calendar deputy position to a trial deputy position, 
transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion.”343 Ceballos argued 
that these actions directly resulted from the memorandum he drafted and thus 
                                                                                                             
 335. Id. at 572–73.  
 336. Id.  
 337. Id. at 572. 
 338. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006). 
 339. Id. at 413. 
 340. Id. at 414. More specifically,  
After examining the affidavit and visiting the location it described, Ceballos 
determined the affidavit contained serious misrepresentations. The affidavit 
called a long driveway what Ceballos thought should have been referred to 
as a separate roadway. Ceballos also questioned the affidavit’s statement that 
tire tracks led from a stripped-down truck to the premises covered by the 
warrant. His doubts arose from his conclusion that the roadway’s 
composition in some places made it difficult or impossible to leave visible 
tire tracks.  
Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 415. 
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amounted to a violation of his First Amendment rights.344 His employer 
disagreed and asserted that these actions were based on legitimate, 
employment-related concerns.345 In deciding this case, the United States 
Supreme Court applied the Pickering Test to determine when a public 
employee’s speech is protected.346 Pursuant to this test, a court must make 
two inquiries: 
The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a 
citizen on a matter of public concern. If the answer is no, the 
employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or 
her employer's reaction to the speech. If the answer is yes, then 
the possibility of a First Amendment claim arises. The [Second] 
question becomes whether the relevant government entity had an 
adequate justification for treating the employee differently from 
any other member of the general public. This consideration 
reflects the importance of the relationship between the speaker's 
expressions and employment. A government entity has broader 
discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer, 
but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has 
some potential to affect the entity's operations.347 
In applying this standard to the case, the Court held that his speech 
was not protected by the First Amendment.348 First, the court reasoned that 
it was not dispositive that Ceballos made his statements inside his office 
rather than publicly because employees nonetheless may receive First 
Amendment protection for workplace expressions.349 In reaching this 
particular conclusion, the Court wanted to make clear that expressions 
made in the office context do not result automatically in a right to 
restrict.350 Second, the Court reasoned that it was not dispositive that the 
memorandum concerned the subject matter of Ceballos’s employment.351 
The Court was careful to highlight this point because it realized the 
employees in a particular workplace setting may be in the best position to 
speak about a particular issue because of their knowledge about the 
workplace and its operation.352 In reaching its conclusion that Ceballos’s 
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speech was not protected, the Court relied heavily on the fact that his 
comments were made in the scope of his workplace duties; in fact, 
Ceballos admitted that he prepared the memorandum pursuant to his job 
as a prosecutor.353 As such, the Court determined that Ceballos was 
speaking as a government employee and not as a general citizen.354 An 
employee may speak generally about issues concerning his employment, 
but when that speech begins to connect with the employee’s official 
workplace responsibilities and capacity, the government will have a 
greater right to restrict the employee’s speech.355 As the court noted, 
Official communications have official consequences, creating a 
need for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors must 
ensure that their employees’ official communications are accurate, 
demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer's 
mission. Ceballos’ memo is illustrative. It demanded the attention 
of his supervisors and led to a heated meeting with employees 
from the sheriff's department. If Ceballos’ superiors thought his 
memo was inflammatory or misguided, they had the authority to 
take proper corrective action.356 
These cases thoroughly illustrate that the government must respect the 
free speech rights of government employees when the employee’s speech 
relates to matters of concern for the general citizenry and is not specifically 
within the scope of the employment relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the test advanced by this Article is not designed to 
undermine the contractual relationship between corporations and athlete-
endorsers. Morals clauses will and should continue to empower corporations 
to protect their brand images. Corporations, however, should not possess the 
power to use morals clauses to restrict speech unreasonably that otherwise 
should be protected. When morals clauses operate to restrict this type of 
speech, they harm the athlete-endorser as well as the public. The voice of 
the modern athlete is a critical voice in inspiring positive change. As 
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evidenced by the historical accounts of Muhammad Ali, Tommie Smith, and 
John Carlos, athletes have the power to bring issues of injustice to the 
consciousness of the world. Athletes, via their respective athletic platforms 
and social acclaim, have the capacity to express their ideas in a way that 
resonate with people who might not otherwise be receptive to certain ideas. 
